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Antitrust law has long been mindful of the danger that firms may misuse their patents to 
facilitate price fixing. Courts and commentators addressing this danger have assumed that 
patent-facilitated price fixing occurs in a single market. In this Article, we extend 
conventional analysis to address firms’ patent misuse to facilitate price fixing across 
multiple products lines. By doing so, we expose gaps in existing agency enforcement and 
scholarly proposals for reform. Important legal tests that make sense in the single market 
setting do not carry over to the context we call serial collusion, where certain offenders 
engage in repeat collusion across product lines. This Article argues that there is an urgent 
need to recast these tests to address serial collusion of the sort that prevails in the 
chemicals, auto parts and electronics industries. To support this argument, we develop 
empirical evidence consistent with the possibility that serial colluders in the chemical 
industry acquired and used patents to support their collusion, either directly to coordinate 
and monitor output and pricing or indirectly to deter new firm entry by erecting patent 
thickets as a barrier to entry. Throughout this Article, we describe the flaws of current 
antitrust doctrine when it comes to assessing patents and price fixing, suggest doctrinal 
improvements, and provide guidance to antitrust enforcers about how to better understand 
and combat serial collusion facilitated by patents. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the history of antitrust enforcement, patents have occupied center stage in a number 
of Supreme Court cases addressing horizontal price fixing and conspiracies to 
monopolize.4 As one eminent economist has observed, “some of the worst price fixing 
schemes in American history were erected on a foundation of agreements to cross-license 
                                                 
4 Notable examples include United States v. Singer Manufacturing Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963); United 
States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U.S. 371 (1952); United States v. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948); United 
States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948); Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 324 U.S. 570 (1945); 
Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. United States, 283 U.S. 163 (1931).  




complementary and competing patents.” 5  Over forty years ago, a formative study by 
George Priest identified the collusive potential of patent licenses. Priest described how a 
patent owner might, through licensing agreements with rivals, create a cartel: 
The Patent Act, as interpreted by the courts, has allowed persons granted or 
assigned patents broad authority to set licensee output, to allocate licensee 
territories, and even to fix minimum licensee prices. This has meant that a 
group of firms agreeing, in violation of the Sherman Act, either to fix prices 
or allocate output, could disguise its agreement by obtaining a patent on an 
unimportant process and executing licenses to previously competing 
members which incorporate the provisions of the illegal agreement.6 
 
In essence, a patent holder, who can control output and thus affect prices for products that 
make use of its invention, could become a ring leader for a cartel under the cover of 
organizing a patent licensing scheme.  
Early in the twentieth century, courts struggled to characterize patent licenses and pools 
that increased patent-based profits by restraining market competition. The recent FTC v. 
Actavis, Inc. decision recalled this body of law and noted: “[United States v. Line Material 
Co.] explained that ‘the improper use of [a patent] monopoly,’ is ‘invalid’ under the 
antitrust laws and resolved the antitrust question in that case by seeking an accommodation 
‘between the lawful restraint on trade of the patent monopoly and the illegal restraint 
prohibited broadly by the Sherman Act.’”7 Courts were generally deferential to patent 
                                                 
5 FREDERIC M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 452 (2d 
ed. 1980). See also Irene Till, The Legal Monopoly, in THE MONOPOLY MAKERS: RALPH NADER’S STUDY 
GROUP REPORT ON REGULATION AND COMPETITION 289, 307 (Mark J. Green ed., 1973) (“Harnessed to serve 
the ends of corporate enterprise, the patent has become a potent instrument for restraint of trade.”). 
6 George L. Priest, Cartels and Patent License Arrangements, 20 J.L. & ECON. 309, 309 (1977). 
Other commentators from this period who identified the collusive possibilities posed by patent licensing 
agreements include LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 551–54 (1977) 
[hereinafter HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST]; Till, supra note 5, at 310 (“Licensing agreements have 
contained production and marketing quotas for licensees. Directly or indirectly they have served as vehicles 
for setting prices and establishing limited market territories . . . .”); William F. Baxter, Legal Restrictions on 
Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An Economic Analysis, 76 YALE L.J. 267, 336 (1966) (observing that 
price restrictions in patent licensing agreements can constitute “the backbone of a loose-knit cartel”).  
7 570 U.S. 136, 148 (2013) (citing Line Material, 333 U.S. at 310). 




licensing schemes so long as they were confined to the duration of the patent agreement 
and did not involve products beyond the patented product.8 
In the years between Line Material 9  and recent pay-for-delay cases, government 
antitrust agencies have detected and prosecuted several thousand price-fixing 
agreements.10 Yet, judicial decisions, enforcement agency statements, and other accounts 
of these agreements rarely mention patents. This absence puzzles us. One possible reason 
is that judicial opinions and enforcement agency guidance, especially from the 1930s 
through the 1970s, discouraged price-fixers from using patents to advance their goals.11 
The wariness of antitrust policy concerning patent licensing practices crested in the late 
1970s with the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) issuance of what became known as the “Nine 
No-Nos”—a set of licensing practices that the Antitrust Division would regard as per se 
illegal violations of the Sherman Act. 12  In response, companies perhaps worried that 
restrictive patent license terms would elicit enforcement agency scrutiny and avoided using 
patents for collusive ends. Few major antitrust cases involving price fixing and patents 
came before the Supreme Court from the 1970s to 2000s, until the eyes of the antitrust 
                                                 
8 See Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33–34 (1964) (ruling that a contract requiring the licensee 
to pay royalties to the licensor after the licensed patent had expired was patent misuse); see also Kimble v. 
Marvel Ent., LLC, 576 U.S. 446, 465 (2015) (reaffirming principle of Brulotte). The most contentious and 
often revisited issue in this period involved United States v. General Electric, Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926), 
where the Supreme Court validated a licensing term by which the licensor set the price of the licensee’s 
output from the application of the licensed patent. See infra notes 100–04 (discussing judicial reconsideration 
of General Electric).  
9 333 U.S. 287 (1948). 
10 The Workload Reports prepared by the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) for 
fiscal years 1960 through 2019 indicate that the DOJ initiated nearly 2,800 criminal cases alleging violations 
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. See Division Operations, DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/atr/division-
operations (last accessed May 13, 2021) (providing downloadable workload statistics regarding agency 
enforcement actions by primary type of conduct at issue). Most of these matters involved horizontal price 
fixing or agreements among competitors to allocate customers or sales territories. See id. 
11 ANDREW I. GAVIL ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN 
COMPETITION POLICY 1111–22 (3d ed. 2017).  
12 Id. at 1112. In 1995, the federal antitrust agencies issued guidelines that retreated significantly 
from the positions staked out in the “Nine No-Nos.” Id. at 1122–23. 




world turned to pay-for-delay agreements in the pharmaceutical context between makers 
of branded and generic drugs in Actavis.13  
In this Article, we offer a different conjecture. Focusing on the rampant price fixing in 
the chemical industry from 1980 to present as a case study,14 we contend that patents 
probably still do play a significant role in price fixing—a role that has gone unnoticed by 
enforcers. Our extensive examination of serial collusion in the chemical industry and our 
empirical evidence of patenting practices by collusive chemical firms leads us to this 
conclusion. Instead, patents are probably an important device to help manage and maintain 
cartels, especially among serial colluders, as described in greater detail below.  
In a recent article on price fixing, we coined the term “serial colluder” to designate 
multi-product firms that have participated in many cartels, involving a range of 
participants, and initiated at different dates.15 Several chemical firms meet this definition 
because of their participation in at least thirty different chemical cartels spanning at least 
three decades.16 Our earlier article also addressed the business model of serial colluders 
and the failure of anti-cartel law to deter such behavior. In some cases, weak monitoring 
and high-powered incentive payments to product division managers may have fostered 
multiple cartels without encouragement from, or even contrary to the instructions of, upper 
management. This “rogue manager” explanation of serial collusion is often invoked by 
corporate directors seeking a story that deflects blame away from them. A more troubling 
explanation for serial collusion is that price fixing is an integral part of the business model 
of certain firms, and high-level managers advocate for and assist with collusion throughout 
                                                 
13 Pay-for-delay cases involve agreements between producers of branded, patented pharmaceutical 
products and generic entrants that keep a competing—and allegedly infringing—generic product from 
entering the market. GAVIL ET AL., supra note 11, at 1161–79. These cases present difficult characterization 
questions, and courts have struggled to decide whether these agreements are per se illegal instances of price 
fixing, per se lawful and socially desirable uses of patents, or, as the Supreme Court recently concluded in 
FTC v. Actavis, something in a middle ground that should be evaluated under the rule of reason. 570 U.S. 
136 (2013); Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason in the Post-Actavis World, 2018 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 
25 (2018). 
14 William E. Kovacic et al., Serial Collusion by Multi-Product Firms, 6 J. ANTITRUST ENF’T 296 
(2018) [hereinafter Serial Collusion]; Robert C. Marshall, Unobserved Collusion: Warning Signs and 
Concerns, 5 J. ANTITRUST ENF’T 329 (2017) [hereinafter Unobserved Collusion]. In this Article we refer to 
these works as our “prequel papers.” 
15 Note that a firm could be a recidivist but not a serial colluder, and that a serial colluder does not 
need to be a recidivist. 
16  Serial Collusion, supra note 14, at 301–13. 




the firm. We believe serial colluders in certain industries have run “portfolios of cartels.” 
In support of this “business model” explanation, in previous work we presented various 
kinds of indirect evidence that serial colluders in the chemical industry have indeed run a 
portfolio of cartels.17  Unaddressed in that previous work is an examination of how serial 
colluders may use patents and patent licensing schemes to initiate or maintain a cartel.  
In Section I of this paper, we find that serial colluders increased patenting during the 
duration of their cartels, which is consistent with the theory that these firms use new patents 
to support cartelization. The magnitude of this increase is above and beyond incremental 
increases in patenting over time. We also find that “core” serial colluders (but not other 
major serial colluding chemical firms) increased patenting on products that they did not 
produce but that were being cartelized by their fellow colluders, which is consistent with 
the view that serial colluders engage in reciprocal practices across distinct markets.18 On 
the whole, our analysis of patenting practices for serial colluders in the chemical space 
suggests ongoing use of patents to initiate or maintain cartels, a practice that may apply to 
other industries with serial colluders as well.  
Finding that the empirical data support our hypothesis of serial colluders using patents 
to create and maintain cartels, we next probe in Sections II and III reasons for why this 
conduct might evade agency enforcement and effectively help to coordinate cartels. Unlike 
the older cartels that openly used patents to directly restrain output, modern serial colluders 
running a portfolio of cartels potentially use patents in ways that are indirect and less likely 
to be noticed by private plaintiffs and government enforcers. We then explore how cartel 
participants in the modern era (excepting pay-for-delay cases like Actavis) appear to use 
patents to deter entry into cartelized markets, facilitate intrafirm communications and 
actions in support of collusive conduct, and communicate with other serial colluders about 
their portfolio of cartels under the guise of discussing their portfolio of patent licenses. 
 For the remainder of the Article, we discuss how the existing antitrust 
jurisprudence regarding patents and price fixing requires major upgrades to account for the 
                                                 
17 This evidence will be reviewed in Section III.B.   
18 A firm is identified as a non-producer if the relevant European Commission Prohibition Decision 
(EC decision) did not identify the firm as a producer. If the firm produced the product exclusively for internal 
consumption or made the product but only sold it outside of the European Union, then we would still label 
the firm as a non-producer.  




dramatic modern improvements in our understanding of the economics of collusion. In 
older cases, judges recognized that firms could use patent licenses directly to restrict 
output, raise prices, or boost competitors’ marginal costs, 19  but they may not have 
appreciated the many indirect ways that patents can increase cartel stability and 
profitability. As discussed in greater detail below, patents provide an avenue for ongoing 
communication among rivals about output and pricing. Patent pools and cross-licensing 
arrangements are especially useful for organizing cartels across product types. 
Furthermore, licensing regimes may permit a firm to organize supportive resources within 
the firm without raising legal compliance concerns.  
Anticipating these benefits to cartel formation and maintenance, this Article goes 
on to suggest that serial colluders may engage in strategic patenting. That is, they procure 
patents to advance cartel goals rather than to promote innovation. We present data on global 
patent procurement by price fixers in the chemical industry that is consistent with this view. 
Importantly, firms managing a portfolio of cartels can use patents in a reciprocal way to 
stabilize cartels across markets where not all firms participate as producers in each market. 
Within the network of chemical cartels, for example, we see evidence that certain firms use 
patents to promote cartels in markets for products they do not produce. Firms may use the 
threat of a patent lawsuit to punish deviators and discourage outsiders from attempting to 
enter a cartelized market. They may also use patent licenses to audit licensee sales and 
monitor compliance with cartel rules. One firm might perform such a service for other 
firms in the collusive network with the expectation that the non-participant would get 
similar help managing their own portfolio of cartels from other serial colluders in the 
future.  
Further, in this Article, we probe deeply into the ways serial colluders can 
coordinate their patent practices to enhance cartel profits and stabilize their cartels. Our 
previous work on serial collusion documented that modern anti-collusion enforcement has 
not adequately deterred massive, prolonged multi-market price-fixing schemes.20 We also 
                                                 
19 See Section III.A’s discussion of Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. United States, 238 U.S. 163 
(1931), Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945), and E. Bement and Sons v. National 
Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70 (1902). 
20  Serial Collusion, supra note 14, at 297–301. 




explained how various forms of reciprocity among serial colluders increased their cartel 
profits and made cartels more resilient.21 We expand on this topic with respect to the use 
of patents for cartelization, which we touched on only briefly in previous work.  
This Article also describes gaps in existing antitrust enforcement and scholarly 
analysis of patenting practices. Recognition of serial collusion helps us to identify further 
flaws in the conventional treatment of patent licenses that allegedly facilitate price fixing. 
As one example, case law favors vertical patent licenses by applying rule of reason analysis 
to restrictions that could earn per se condemnation if organized as horizontal licenses.22 
Such deference stems partly from worries that anti-collusion enforcement could weaken 
returns to patents and discourage research and innovation, as well as concerns that there 
may be legitimate reasons for suppliers, manufacturers, retailers to coordinate some 
activities. Yet, past practice of serial colluders show that firms can and do evade per se 
condemnation by simply organizing a middle man to stand as an upstream patent pool 
organizer. Thus, we reject such deference for vertically organized patent licenses in the 
context of serial colluders that are managing a portfolio of cartels, because what appears to 
be a vertical relationship is often part of the network of connections among serial colluders. 
Similarly, the leading scholarly commentary on patents and price fixing suggests that 
socially desirable licenses can be sorted from socially harmful licenses by determining 
whether significant rents flow to the licensor.23 This test may be effective in the context of 
an isolated cartel affecting a single market.24 As we explain in Section IV, this test has little 
or no value in the context of serial collusion where the firms are managing a portfolio of 
cartels. 
 Finally, in this Article, we provide additional policy recommendations tailored to 
the abuse of patents by serial colluders. Our earlier work lays out various reforms to anti-
collusion policy that could mitigate the harms of serial collusion. In Section V, we go 
                                                 
21 Serial colluders can respond to shocks that might destabilize their cartels by adjusting rewards to 
members via subcontracting agreements, sales of plants or divisions from one member to another, or even by 
coordinated entry into a market by one firm and exit by another. Id. at 330–34. 
22 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, Antitrust Issues Involving Intellectual Property, ANTITRUST 
LAW DEVELOPMENTS, vol. 2, ch. 11, at 1107–10 (8th ed. 2017) [hereinafter ANTITRUST LAW 
DEVELOPMENTS] (discussing treatment of customer, territorial, and field of use restrictions). 
23 Priest, supra note 6. 
24 Id. 




further and explain how certain patent-related behaviors by firms that do not participate 
directly in cartelizing a particular market can be used to infer collusion in that market (when 
the outsider is part of a network of serial colluders). We also discuss penalties and liability 
that antitrust and patent agencies should impose on firms that use their patents to facilitate 
collusion by others. Specifically, we argue for generous application of the patent misuse 
defense to render unenforceable patents used to facilitate price fixing.25 Entry would be 
easier and patent-based cartel punishments would be eliminated if cartel patents are left 
unenforceable. Finally, we identify possible adjustments in the institutional arrangements 
by which the federal antitrust enforcement agencies address the use of patents and patent 
licensing to facilitate collusion.  
This Article is organized as follows. Section I presents empirical evidence that serial 
collusion is a serious problem, that serial colluders in the chemical industry use the patent 
system intensively in ways that suggest strategic patenting, and that their patenting 
behavior is consistent with their use of patents to enhance multi-market price fixing.  
Section II considers the evolution of antitrust doctrine and policy related to patent assertion 
and licensing as collusive devices. Notwithstanding existing strictures, this section reviews 
how patent practices can facilitate cartelization. Section III turns to the role that patents can 
play in supporting serial collusion.  Section IV discusses the modernization of doctrines 
related to patents and price fixing in response to the threat of serial collusion. Section V 
offers policy recommendations and additional concluding comments. 
I. SERIAL COLLUSION AND PATENTS: CASE STUDY IN THE GLOBAL 
CHEMICAL INDUSTRY 
Serial collusion in the chemical industry dates back to the 1880s and has reappeared 
in most decades since then.26 German chemical firms have been prominent price-fixers 
                                                 
25 See infra Section V; see also Daryl Lim, Revisiting the Patent Misuse Doctrine: Its Potential 
Contribution to Maintaining Incentives for Innovation, in INNOVATION SOC’Y & INTELL. PROP. 188 (Josef 
Drexl & Anselm Kamperman Sanders eds., 2019) [hereinafter Revisiting Patent Misuse] (setting out the 
patent misuse doctrine and discussing possible procompetitive applications in antitrust law).  
26 Serial Collusion, supra note 14, at 312–13. See also Diarmuid Jeffreys, HELL’S CARTEL: IG 
FARBEN AND THE MAKING OF HITLER’S WAR MACHINE (2010) (documenting the role that German chemical 
industry cartels played to support Nazi Germany’s war mobilization efforts in the 1930s and German military 
production during World War II); Heinrich Kronstein, The Dynamics of German Cartels and Patents. I, 9 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 643 (1942) [hereinafter Dynamics of German Cartels] (discussing cartelization in Germany 




and often cartel ring-leaders, but they have been joined by chemical firms from the 
United States, England, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Canada, Switzerland, South 
Korea, and Japan.27 Dozens of different chemical products have been affected by price 
fixing at some point.28 Historically, some of these collusive agreements were regional; 
others were global. Some were short-lived; others spanned decades. This history, and the 
specific role of patents to instituting and maintaining cartels in the global chemicals 
market, is described below.  
A. Historical and Modern Cartelization of the Global Chemical Industry 
 Patents played a significant role in chemical cartels during the first half of the 
twentieth century.29 Margaret Levenstein observes that “[d]uring most of the 30 years 
preceding World War I, bromine producers in the United States and Europe colluded, 
pooling output, dividing up markets, and raising prices.”30 In the period leading up to 
World War II, German chemical firms engaged in a variety of practices that Heinrich 
Kronstein has called “monopolizing by patents.” 31  One technique employed by the 
“combine” of chemical companies was to direct the research arm of each participant to 
                                                 
from late nineteenth century through mid-twentieth century and analyzing role of patents in facilitating 
cartelization). 
27 The firms listed in Figure 1, infra, were based in Germany, England, France, Belgium, and the 
Netherlands during the periods of collusion. American, South Korean, and Japanese firms participated in the 
lysine cartel; American, Swiss, German, Canadian, and Japanese firms participated in the vitamins cartel; 
American, Swiss, German, and Dutch firms participated in the citric acid cartel, Dutch, Japanese and French 
firms participated in the sodium gluconate cartel; and American, German, and Japanese firms participated in 
the sorbates cartel. DEP’T JUST., Appendix A: Antitrust Division Selected Criminal Cases, April 1, 1996 
through September 30, 1999, https://www.justice.gov/atr/selected-criminal-cases-antitrust-division (last 
accessed June 8, 2021). 
28 Serial Collusion, supra note 14, at 308 fig.5, 312–13. 
29  WYATT WELLS, ANTITRUST AND THE FORMATION OF THE POSTWAR WORLD 12–26 (2002) 
[hereinafter FORMATION OF THE POSTWAR WORLD]. In discussing the durability of German cartels in the steel 
and chemicals sector from the 1880s to World War II, Wells observes that German cartel participants were 
also “adept at cloaking domestic and even international cartels in the guise of patent agreements, the violation 
of which also entailed considerable legal risks.” Id. at 13. See also GEORGE W. STOCKING & MYRON W. 
WATKINS, CARTELS IN ACTION: CASE STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DIPLOMACY 363–517 (1946) 
[hereinafter CARTELS IN ACTION] (recounting the role that patent licensing practices played in the formation 
and operation of chemical industry cartels involving German firms and, in many instances, foreign 
producers). 
30 Margaret C. Levenstein, Do Price Wars Facilitate Collusion? A Study of the Bromine Cartel 
Before World War I, 33 EXPLS. ECON. HIST. 107, 107 (1996). 
31 Dynamics of German Cartels, supra note 26, at 664. 




procure as many patents as possible, to use them for strategic ends.32 From his study of 
patents and cartelization in 1920s Germany, Kronstein reported that “[m]ore and more the 
chemical industry began to apply for patents on practically everything. The research 
laboratories of the few remaining chemical works, connected among themselves by cartel 
and working agreements, systematically studied entire fields and closed them by a large 
number of patents.”33 In fields such as plastics and pharmaceuticals, “[e]ach publication in 
any chemical review or each patent application of any applicant in any country was given 
to the staff of the research laboratory to find anything that could be patented, no matter if 
the patent was a patent of evasion or supplement or protection against other inventors.”34 
This phenomenon Kronstein described resembles the pattern of recent patenting behavior 
in the chemical sector we document below—where patenting activity by cartel participants 
increases dramatically during the period of illegal collaboration for the purpose of 
consolidating market share for existing firms and keeping out entrants.35  
A second method documented by Kronstein and other researchers involves the 
extensive use of patent licensing agreements among major U.S. and foreign chemical 
producers and their subsidiaries to establish effective networks for global cartelization.36 
Kronstein reports that in the decades leading up to World War II, “[t]he participation of an 
American enterprise in a world cartel chiefly through the device of patent exchange became 
very common.”37 In 1946, George Stocking and Myron Watkins reported “that a division 
of market territories for products coming within the scope of [cartel] patents and secret 
processes in a given field usually entail[ed] a complete division of territories for all related 
products.”38  
                                                 
32 Stocking and Watkins share this view with respect to the chemical patent practices of I.G. Farben. 
See CARTELS IN ACTION, supra note 29, at 373 n.16.  
33 Dynamics of German Cartels, supra note 26, at 664. 
34 Id. Kronstein used the term “patent of evasion” to describe patents that sought to work around an 
existing patent to “accomplish[] the same result as a previous patent of another patentee without infringing 
it.” Id. at 664 n.65. 
35 See id.  
36 Dynamics of German Cartels, supra note 26, at 668–71.  
37 Id. at 669. 
38 CARTELS IN ACTION, supra note 29, at 428. American firms in the dyestuffs cartel used patent 
licenses to stabilize their cartel. Id. at 509. Dupont and Nobel used patent licenses to facilitate the explosives 
cartel. Id. at 439. General Electric engaged its foreign counterparts in similar agreements to cartelize the 




A third method of cartelization involved the use of multiple licensing arrangements to 
cartelize entire domestic markets. In the late 1930s, the DOJ successfully challenged Ethyl 
Gasoline Company for creating an elaborate system of licensing arrangements for the 
production and use of tetra-ethyl lead to stabilize prices for motor fuel. 39  In another 
prominent American example of the technique applied outside the chemical sector, in the 
1940s, the DOJ prosecuted United States Gypsum for using minimum price terms in patent 
licenses to cartelize the gypsum wallboard industry.40 For about a decade, Gypsum had 
granted licenses with largely identical price restrictions to nearly all of the industry’s 
numerous firms.41 In upholding the government’s challenge to Gypsum’s licensing terms, 
the Supreme Court observed, “the industry is completely regimented, the production of 
competitive unpatented products suppressed, a class of distributors squeezed out, and 
prices on unpatented products stabilized.”42  
The rash of chemical industry cartelization has continued to modern times. In the three 
decades since 1980, the European Commission (EC) prosecuted chemical producers for 
collusion in 32 separate markets. 43  Notable American antitrust cases brought against 
chemical producers during this period ended cartels in the markets for lysine, citric acid, 
and vitamin C. 44  Since 2010, the Korean Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) fined 
                                                 
production of light bulbs, as did Standard Oil of New Jersey in the hydrogenation of coal into petroleum. 
Dynamics of German Cartels, supra note 26, at 669–70. 
39 Ethyl Gasoline Co. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940). The Supreme Court observed that Ethyl 
“has established the marketing of the patented fuel in vast amounts on a nationwide scale through the 11,000 
jobbers and, at the same time, by the leverage of its licensing contracts resting on the fulcrum of its patents, 
it has built up a combination capable of use, and actually used, as a means of controlling jobbers’ prices and 
suppressing competition among them.” Id. at 457.  
40 United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948). 
41 Id. at 371–86. 
42 Id. at 400. In later years, the DOJ twice prosecuted firms in the U.S. gypsum industry of price 
fixing. In United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978), the defendants defeated charges 
of price fixing based on price information exchanges within the industry. More recently, three American 
drywall manufacturers settled charges of price fixing in 2012 and 2013. See Press Release, Berger & 
Montague, P.C., $125 Million Settlement Reached in Drywall Price-Fixing Lawsuit, MKTS. INSIDER (Jan. 3, 
2018, 4:40 PM), https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/125-million-settlement-reached-in-
drywall-price-fixing-lawsuit-1012446943. 
43 The chemical industry is a good candidate for stable price-fixing agreements. In many markets 
there few producers, products are usually homogeneous, and the long history of cooperative pricing fosters 
trust among colluding firms. 
44 The citric acid cartel is discussed in John M. Connor, What Can We Learn from the ADM Global 
Price Conspiracies? (Purdue Univ. Dep’t Agri. Econ., Staff Paper #98-14, Aug. 1998), 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/227645450. The lysine cartel is discussed in John M. Connor, 




participants in a chemical additives cartel.45 Today, the EC is investigating an ethylene 
cartel, 46 and a massive investigation of serial collusion by generic drug companies is 
ongoing in the United States.47 Whereas the scope of these investigations has not focused 
on what role patents may have played in helping to facilitate these cartels, we suspect that 
patents did play a role.48 We explore this conjecture by examining the patenting behavior 
of colluding firms before, during, and after agency enforcement to explore whether these 
firms may have pursued patents for strategic ends.  
B. Empirical Analysis of Serial Collusion in the Global Chemical Markets, 1980s 
to Present: The Role of Strategic Patenting to Facilitate Cartelization 
Our analysis of strategic patenting in the global chemicals markets starts with the 
information on serial collusion in chemical markets displayed in Figures 1 and 2. The 
companies listed in the rows are all European chemical producers,49 except for the Swiss 
consulting firm Fides/AC Treuhand. The columns list the different chemicals that the EC 
found to be cartelized in the period 1980 to present, from EC Prohibition Decisions (EC 
decisions) listed in Appendix A. Subsequent graphs replace the chemical names with the 
                                                 
“Our Customers are Our Enemies”: The Lysine Cartel of 1992–1995, 18 REV. IND. ORG. 5, 10 (2001) 
[hereinafter Lysine Cartel]. The Vitamin C cartel is discussed in Mitsuru Igami & Takuo Sugaya, MEASURING 
THE INCENTIVE TO COLLUDE: THE VITAMIN CARTELS, 1990-1999 (Mar. 7, 2017), 
http://economics.mit.edu/files/12734. 
45 See, e.g., KOREAN FAIR TRADE COMM’N, Korea Fair Trade Commission Imposes Sanctions 
against Detected Cases of Collusion in Chemical Additives Essential for Plastic Products (November 21, 
2014), 
http://www.ftc.go.kr/solution/skin/doc.html?fn=ea8619c859a43bfca52257aaf1c0fed13159d5768ec671b5d1
0b363dba0967b3&rs=/fileupload/data/result/BBSMSTR_000000002402/ (imposing sanctions and fines 
against five producers of chemical additives for plastic products due to price and quantity collusion between 
2002 and 2013). 
46 Margaret Volkova, Celanese Reserves USD88 Million Related to European Commission Ethylene 
Cartel Investigation, MKT. REP. CO. (Dec. 26, 2019), http://www.mrcplast.com/news-news_open-
363613.html. 
47  DEP’T JUST., Antitrust Division Update 2020: Generic Drugs, 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/division-operations/antitrust-division-update-2020/generic-drugs (last updated 
June 23, 2020).  
48 One exception is lysine. Lysine Cartel, supra note 44, at 10. Archer Daniels Midland (ADM) 
entered the lysine market even though Ajinomoto held patents on manufacturing techniques. Connor’s 
account of testimony at the ADM price fixing trial indicates that “Ajinomoto believed that ADM had stolen 
its patented lysine microorganisms, and the trial transcript makes clear that ADM did attempt to steal lysine 
secrets from Ajinomoto.” Id. He adds that “Ajinomoto had filed a patent-infringement suit against ADM 
concerning the amino acid threonine (which Ajinomoto won).” Id. at 12 n.10. 
49 American, Japanese, and Korean chemical firms also were involved in price fixing during this 
period. See Lysine Cartel, supra note 44, at 7–12 (discussing membership of lysine cartel). 




number listed below each chemical, as identified in Appendix A. The grey color in a box 
indicates that the firm participated in a cartel for that chemical market, as determined from 
EC decisions as well. All of these decisions are listed in Appendix A by chemical name. 
These cartels had different start dates, end dates, and durations; some cartels operated for 
as long as 30 years.50 The duration of each cartel is displayed in Figure 2.51 
Next, for each of the chemical producers subject to EC decisions listed in Figure 1, we 
studied patenting activity near to the time of the relevant cartel.52 We first counted global 
patent applications53 that were ultimately granted for each of the firm-participants to a 
cartel during that cartel’s active period,54 determined from the relevant EC decision and 
labeled as the “plea period.” We then tallied patenting in the 10 years before and after the 
plea period in order to analyze trends in patenting for these firms. Since the length of the 
plea periods varied, the patent applications during the plea period were rescaled to ten-year 
periods.55 The results of these patent tallies—“pre-plea,” “plea,” and “post-plea”—are 
                                                 
50 An EC decision might not always reveal the true start date of a cartel. When firms admit to guilt 
as part of negotiations with the EC, they have an incentive to bargain to shorten the reported cartel duration 
so as to reduce fines and damages from follow-on civil litigation. Thus, the start date reported in an EC 
decision may be the result of a negotiation between the Commission and the cartelists. 
51 This figure is reproduced from Serial Collusion, supra note 14, at 308 fig.5. 
52 In 2017, one of us (Marshall) acknowledged the difficulties of analyzing unobserved, explicit 
collusion:  
Before moving forward, allow me to note that we do not know the extent and scope of 
unobserved explicit collusion. At one extreme, all previously existing explicit collusion 
may have been detected and no continuing or new explicit collusion may exist. At another 
extreme, detected explicit collusion may be just the tip of the iceberg. Namely, there may 
be vast amounts [of collusion] continuing and newly forming throughout the world. Unlike 
some other illegal activities, measuring the scope and magnitude of unobserved explicit 
collusion suffers from truncation, which creates classically difficult inference problems.  
Unobserved Collusion, supra note 14, at 330. 
53 We counted patent applications as opposed to granted patents because there is a significant delay 
between patent applications and grants. The count of applications that matured into grants helps us identify 
the immediate response of firms to the formation of a cartel. 
54 Appendix B provides a detailed description of how we assembled these numbers. This appendix 
should enable the reader to fully reproduce everything we report here. 
55 For example, if a plea period was 5 years, then the patent applications for each firm were 
multiplied by two. If the plea period ran for 30 years, the patent applications for the plea period were 
multiplied by one-third.  




reflected in three columns in Figure 3. Further explanation of how these patents were tallied 
and organized appears in Appendix B. 
 
Figure 1: European Chemical Firm Cartel Involvement by Product Market, 

































Figure 2: European Chemical Firm Cartel Involvement by Firm, from EC 
Decisions 1980 to Present 
 
 




Figure 3: Empirical Findings Regarding Patenting by Large Multi-Product 
Chemical Firms that Regularly Participate in Cartels    
Firm 
Producers of Cartel Chemical Non-producers of Cartel Chemical 
Pre-plea Plea Post-plea Pre-plea Plea Post-plea 
Akzo 105 158 128 207 414 389 
BASF 246 523 824 1037 1639 1527 
Bayer 490 610 541 523 753 653 
Solvay 157 223 303 107 175 267 
Degussa 189 280 461 109 190 331 
Shell 154 262 416 289 185 153 
ICI 283 257 214 119 74 41 
Arkema (AAA) 291 326 586 119 115 149 
Hoechst 168 458 891 557 439 131 
RP 23 89 38 277 276 253 
Aventis 4 62 36 55 148 246 
Total 2110 3248 4438 3399 4408 4140 
% Change, Pre-
plea to Plea 
 54%   30%  
% Change, Plea 
to Post-plea 
  37%   -6% 
 
Figure 4: Patenting Practices of “Core” Serial Colluders, as Compared to 
“Non-core” Serial Colluders 
Firm 
Producers of Cartel Chemical Non-producers of Cartel Chemical 
Pre-plea Plea Post plea Pre-plea Plea Post-plea 
“Core” Serial 
Producers 
1187 1794 2257 1983 3171 3167 
% Change, Pre-
plea to Plea 
 51%   60%  
% Change, Plea 
to Post-plea 




923 1454 2181 1416 1237 973 
% change pre-
plea to plea 
 58%   -13%  
% change plea 
to post-plea 
  50%   -21% 
 
  




As noted above, Figure 3 displays the tallies of the number of patents that firms applied 
for in three time periods: “pre-plea,” “plea,” and “post-plea.” Patents were organized by 
filing date and only tallied if a patent was ultimately granted. For each firm, patents 
awarded in these periods were sorted into two groups: on the left side, chemical patents 
awarded to cartel members, aggregated across enforcement actions (“Producers of Cartel 
Chemical”); on the right side, patents associated with a firm who was not party to the cartel 
or a producer of the cartel product, as adjudged by review of the same enforcement actions 
(“Non-producers of Cartel Chemical”). We relied on EC reports to determine if a firm was 
a seller of a chemical and was not prosecuted as a member of the cartel for that chemical.56 
The bottom of Figure 3 displays totals of patents awarded across the three relevant time 
periods for each firm. We also calculated the percentage changes in patenting for each firm 
and overall across the pre-plea to plea time frames and plea to post-plea time frames. The 
trends that this data reveal is analyzed in greater detail below.  
Figure 4 reorganizes the same data from Figure 3, sorting firms into two buckets: “core” 
serial colluders and “non-core” serial colluders.57 “Core” serial colluders include Akzo, 
BASF, Bayer, Solvay, and Degussa (ABBSD). The remaining six firms (Shell, ICI, 
Arkema, Hoechst, RP, and Aventis) were marked as “non-core” serial colluders.  
From review of the data in Figure 3, we find that there was a surge in patenting by 
cartel members on chemicals covered by the cartel during the plea period. In the plea-
period, the adjusted total number of patent applications by the chemical firms which the 
EC deemed to have participated in a cartel for a given product was over 3,200 patents, as 
compared to close to 2,100 patents in the pre-plea period. The total number of patent 
applications was 54% higher for serial colluders in the plea period than in the pre-plea 
period, reflecting a surge in patenting activity. This trend continued in the post-plea period, 
                                                 
56 More precisely, we have no information that these firms are producers. The EC prohibition 
decisions do not name them—an omission that may only mean that the firm had no sales for the product in 
the European Union. A “non-producer” could make the product entirely for internal consumption. In addition, 
a “non-producer” could be making the product and not selling any of its output in the Europe Union. We 
address some of these classification distinctions in Section III.C. 
57 We call Akzo, BASF, Bayer, Solvay, and Degussa the “core” serial colluders because they are 
the only serial colluders who engaged in the anomalous behavior of increased patenting of products that they 
did not produce but which were cartelized by others. Also, these are the most frequent colluders, active in at 
least seven cartels, except for Degussa, which was active in six. Finally, BASF and Bayer are the two main 
descendants of the I.G. Farben conglomerate of Germany.  




where the number of patent applications by serial colluders rose to close to 4,400 patents, 
37% higher in the post-plea period than in the plea period. Appendix B provides firm-
specific details corroborating these results.  
Is a 54% increase in patenting activity between the pre-plea and plea periods large 
enough to raise suspicions about suspect motivations for patenting? Finding a good 
benchmark for patenting activity is quite difficult. Trying to benchmark cartel participant 
patenting activity against others in the industry is not a perfect solution, as other chemical 
firms are potentially involved in collusion across other product types or their behavior may 
be influenced by the cartel firms, even if they are not formal members of the cartel. For 
example, patenting activity by Japanese chemical firms does not appear to be very different 
than that of the European producers listed in Figure 1, but that could simply reflect the use 
of patents by Japanese and European firms to define exclusive territories as part of 
coordinated conduct.58 Nevertheless, the fact that patenting for serial colluders increased 
more across the pre-plea to the plea periods as compared to the plea to post-plea periods 
may be a good indicator of suspect motivations for patenting. If innovation was 
accelerating at an increasing rate, then we would expect for the results to be the opposite. 
Further, it is important to remember that the plea periods for these cartels all differ in time; 
thus, a surge in innovation over some specific time period is very unlikely to explain the 
results. Rather, it seems that serial colluders deliberately increased patenting during plea 
periods at a rate untethered to innovation improvements, for reasons further discussed 
below. 
Another interesting trend emerges from review of producer versus non-producer 
patenting during the relevant pre-plea, plea and post-plea periods. If there was no 
coordinated activity among non-cartel and cartel members, one would not expect any spike 
in patenting for non-producers in the relevant periods above and beyond innovation 
improvements. And yet, the data suggest that non-producer firms to some degree may 
strategically be seeking patents during the relevant time periods as well. The “core” serial 
                                                 
58  Another potential benchmark might be university patent applications. That possibility is 
diminished by the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (1980), which created great incentives for 
universities and others receiving federal grants to seek patent applications. Enactment of Bayh-Dole means 
that the rapid increase for these institutions is almost surely just a result of the change in the regulatory 
environment. 




colluders, Akzo, BASF, Bayer, Degussa, and Solvay (ABBDS), generated over 4,400 
patents related to chemical products that they themselves did not make but that their other 
regular co-conspirators did make and cartelized markets for. Notably, core serial colluder 
patent applications for cartelized products that they did not make increased by 60% from 
the pre-plea to the plea period; a spike in patenting similar to that for producing firms 
actually party to the cartel at issue. By contrast, as shown in Figure 4, patent applications 
for non-core serial colluders in cartelized products that they did not make fell by 13% from 
the pre-plea to plea periods and fell by 21% from the plea to post-plea periods. This 
suggests the ABBDS firms garnered patents that could be used in a reciprocal fashion to 
support cartels operated by their compatriots.  
 Of course, we cannot entirely reject the possibility that these patterns of patenting are 
due to non-collusive motivations. As noted above, alternative explanations are industry-
wide or firm-specific innovation improvements. Some jumps or falls in patenting could 
also be random occurrences. Yet, several facts cast doubt upon such explanations. First, 
the firms at issue regularly participate in cartels with one another across a broad array of 
chemical products.59 Second, as described in greater detail below, patents are very useful 
tools to facilitate cartel conduct.60 Third, the fact that the increase in patent applications by 
cartel members from the pre-plea to the plea period is greater than the increase from the 
plea to the post-plea period strongly suggests an incremental value of patents for these 
firms above and beyond protecting intellectual property. Fourth, a surge in patent 
applications by the core serial colluder firms on products that they do not make but for 
which their frequent co-conspirators are engaged in a cartel strongly suggests that at least 
this subset of core serial colluders use patents to facilitate cartel conduct across products. 
Finally, it is noteworthy that the plea periods for the 32 cartels that we analyze have 
different start and end dates. Thus, the data we report across Figures 3 and 4 are unlikely 
to be driven by some industry-wide innovation surge over a specific time period. Also, the 
finding of a patent surge for non-producers from the pre-plea to the plea period pertains to 
only the five most active cartel firms and not the other six. This implies that surges in 
patenting are not being driven by some industry-wide phenomenon.  
                                                 
59 See Section III.B 
60 See Section II.A. 




Having identified certain suspect patenting practices by serial colluders in the chemical 
industry, we next explain that this behavior is rationally related to instituting and 
maintaining a cartel. Before doing so, we lay some groundwork for how antitrust law 
approaches collusive schemes involving patents and patent licensing. Then, we describe 
competitive pressures that might drive firms to seek out patents as a means to institute and 
maintain a cartel.  
II. PATENTS, COMPETITION, AND COLLUSION: THE EVOLUTION OF 
ANTITRUST DOCTRINE AND POLICY  
Most antitrust scholars agree that the patent system has procompetitive effects when it 
works as intended. 61  Patents give inventors incentives to create new technology by 
strengthening their ability to earn profits that cover the cost of inventing.62 Patents achieve 
this end by giving their owners the right to exclude others from making, using, and selling 
the patented technology during the patent term. In return, patent owners must disclose their 
invention to the public; thus, sharing the knowledge that they created.63 This knowledge 
will enter the public domain at the end of the patent period. 
The right to exclude—the patent’s vital legal trait—is not an unmixed social blessing. 
This right may slow the diffusion of new technology and sometimes leads to market power 
in a patented product. These social costs must be balanced against the social gains arising 
from patents’ innovation incentives and knowledge disclosure function. Moreover, patents 
do not completely bar other firms from using the patented technology. Importantly, these 
firms are free to utilize the invention if they obtain a license from the patent owner. When 
patent owners and other inventors or manufacturers can come to an agreement to license 
                                                 
61 FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND 
PATENT LAW AND POLICY, ch. 1 (Oct. 2003) [hereinafter TO PROMOTE INNOVATION]. 
62 FREDERIC M. SCHERER & DAVID R. ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 621–30 (3d ed. 1990); Stanley M. Besen & Leo J. Raskind, An Introduction to the Law and 
Economics of Intellectual Property, 5 J. ECON. PERSPS. 3 (1991). 
63 This bargain—exclusivity in return for disclosure—is a basic foundation for the U.S. process 
through which patent rights are granted. CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION 
WITHOUT RESTRAINT: PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION 62–67 (2012); ROBERT P. 
MERGES, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 247–302 (7th ed. 2017). 




the patented technology during the patent term, society gains doubly from the speedy 
diffusion of new technology and royalty payments that reward inventors. 
 As a general matter, patent owners enjoy considerable discretion to draft patent 
licensing agreements that they desire. Antitrust law usually allows said license agreements 
to restrict licensees’ output, fields of use, or freedom to market covered products. 64 
Antitrust law also tolerates license royalty provisions that raise the marginal cost of 
licensees.65 Relative to the absence of licensing, these restraints on competition during the 
patent’s term are tolerated on the ground that such restrictions tend to promote technology 
diffusion and more competitive markets after patent expiration.66  
In some instances, antitrust law also permits agreements among actual or potential 
rivals to determine collectively how a group of firms will exploit their patent rights. The 
creation of the Manufacturers’ Aircraft Association in the early twentieth century provides 
an example of a socially beneficial use of cross-licensing agreements and a patent pool to 
coordinate patent licensing covering complementary patented technologies. At the advent 
of airplane technology, Orville and Wilbur Wright, i.e., the Wright brothers, and, 
separately, Glenn Curtiss, had patent rights covering fundamental airplane technology.67 
No one, including the Wright Brothers and Curtiss, could avoid patent infringement when 
making a commercial airplane unless they had permission from the three patent owners.68 
For years, Curtiss and the Wrights were locked in patent litigation that held up knowledge 
transfer and caused the American airplane industry to lag behind developments in Europe. 
Eventually, the patent owners resolved their dispute in response to pressure from Franklin 
D. Roosevelt, then the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, to expedite preparation for the 
                                                 
64 Weimin Wu, Managing Cartels Through Patent Pools, 64 ANTITRUST BULL. 457, 457–73 (2019). 
See also, Priest, supra note 6, at 314 (“Under the guise of patent license, a cartel can gain supracompetitive 
profits without employing any detectable restriction on price. A cartel can agree on some other aspect of the 
sale of the product to achieve the same result.”). 
65 ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 22, at 1094–118. 
66 HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST, supra note 6, at 525–28. 
67  DAVID MCCULLOUGH, THE WRIGHT BROTHERS 249–53 (2015) (describing patent litigation 
between the Wright brothers and Glenn Curtiss, all early aviation pioneers); LAWRENCE GOLDSTONE, 
BIRDMEN: THE WRIGHT BROTHERS, GLENN CURTISS, AND THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE SKIES (2014) 
(same).  
68 Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective 
Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1341 (1996) (“[W]here different firms hold patents on the basic 
building blocks of the industry’s products, they will have to cross-license to produce at all.”). 




United States’s entry into World War I.69 As a result, Curtiss and the Wright brothers’ 
fundamental patents (and many improvement patents) were contributed to a patent pool 
called the Manufacturer’s Aircraft Association. The pool became a vehicle for airplane 
patent owners to coordinate their patent licensing, but in this case, cooperation improved 
social welfare as compared to no licensing at all.70  
However, patent license terms that maximize value to the licensor and licensee may 
also cause unacceptable harm to third parties.71 For example, antitrust may block a patent 
license agreement that diminishes competition in markets for technology outside the scope 
of the patent.72 Antitrust may also block license agreements aimed at thwarting entry to 
challenge patents that are likely invalid, or the use of such patents to divide a market among 
competitors.73 Both of these results are discussed in greater detail in Section II.A below.  
The tricky question raised in the following section is how courts should distinguish 
legitimate restrictions on competition that appropriately award inventors for their efforts 
from illegitimate restrictions that harm competition without significantly promoting 
invention. To address this inquiry, we sketch the evolution of antitrust enforcement policy 
as it has applied to patent-related practices that could support collusive arrangements. In 
doing so, we present some of the principal scenarios of alleged collusion that have appeared 
in antitrust decisions involving patents, especially in cases that present complex patent 
enforcement and licensing practices. We later propose some ways for settling this line-
drawing question in Section IV.  
A. Patents and Collusion in Antitrust Policy  
From the earliest decades of antitrust law, antitrust policy in some eras has viewed the 
patent system warily and has given careful attention to the possibility that patent licensing 
                                                 
69 Id. at 1356–57 (“In several cases where the government was concerned that technology useful to 
the military was not being developed because of a logjam of conflicting property rights, the lurking threat of 
the eminent domain power contributed to the formation of patent pools.”). 
70 G. R. Simonson, The Demand for Aircraft and the Aircraft Industry, 1907-1958, 20 J. ECON. HIST. 
361, 363–64 n.9 (1960). 
71TO PROMOTE INNOVATION, supra note 61. 
72  DEP’T JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 8–9 (Jan. 12, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/atr/IPguidelines/download 
[hereinafter DOJ/FTC IP GUIDELINES]. 
73 Id. 




and pools could facilitate collusion and the monopolization of entire industries.74 Perhaps 
more than at any time in American history, these concerns crystalized during the 
proceedings in the late 1930s and early 1940s of the Temporary National Economic 
Committee (TNEC) and its “Investigation of Concentration of Economic Power.”75 The 
final TNEC report described the patent system and its operation in scathing terms: 
No one can read the testimony developed before this committee on 
patents without coming to a realization that in many important segments of 
our economy the privilege accorded by the patent monopoly has been 
shamefully abused. . . . It [patenting] has been used as a device to control 
whole industries to suppress competition, to restrict output to enhance 
prices, to suppress innovation, and to discourage inventiveness.76  
 
The TNEC report reflected the work of researchers who had documented how patent 
licensing arrangements had facilitated the cartelization of global markets. 77 The acute 
suspicion with which U.S. antitrust policy sometimes has treated patent licensing 
arrangements almost surely flows out of findings in law enforcement initiatives and 
academic studies from this era that patent licensing helped to cartelize sectors critical to 
                                                 
74 Walton Hamilton’s monograph on “Patents and Free Enterprise” for the Temporary National 
Economic Committee in 1941 recounts the longstanding concern among antitrust specialists that patent 
rights, unless properly constrained, would undermine competition. TEMP. NAT’L ECON. COMM., 76TH CONG., 
INVESTIGATION OF CONCENTRATION OF ECONOMIC POWER: PATENTS AND FREE ENTERPRISE (Comm. Print 
1940) (Walter Hamilton) [hereinafter Hamilton, PATENTS AND FREE ENTERPRISE]. In a section titled “The 
Peril to Free Enterprise,” Hamilton observed that, “[i]n their concern with trade practices, the Federal Trade 
Commission and the Department of Justice have been plagued with a legalistic conception of a patent as a 
sacrosanct area in the economic realm.” Id. at 159. Hamilton cautioned that a rebalancing of the interests of 
the patent system and the antitrust regime was necessary: “If presently the patent is not brought into accord, 
free enterprise can survive only on the fringes of a closed economy.” Id. at 163.  
75 TEMP. NAT’L ECON. COMM., 77th CONG., INVESTIGATION OF CONCENTRATION OF ECONOMIC 
POWER: FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TEMPORARY NATIONAL ECONOMIC COMMITTEE 
(Comm. Print 1941) [hereinafter TNEC FINAL REPORT]. On April 29, 1938, President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
asked Congress to conduct a study of economic concentration in the United States. Id. at 11–20. In June of 
1938, the President approved a joint resolution of Congress establishing a Temporary National Economic 
Committee to conduct the inquiry. Id. at 691–93. The significance of the TNEC proceedings is examined in 
Albert A. Foer, Putting the Antitrust Modernization Commission into Perspective, 51 Buff. L. Rev. 1029, 
1032–36 (2003).  
76 TNEC FINAL REPORT, supra note 75, at 36. 
77 See Hamilton, PATENTS AND FREE ENTERPRISE, supra note 74, at 165 (“In peace or at war the 
international cartel poses its problem. A corporation barricades its monopoly by securing grants in all the 
dominant nations. If concerns here and abroad lay claim to rival technologies, the conflict is usually resolved 
by a private understanding. . . . The consumer is denied the protection of competition; and an agreement 
between gentlemen which vaults over frontiers becomes the actual regulation of commerce with foreign 
nations.”). 




the World War II mobilization effort.78 The TNEC proceedings also lent support to existing 
efforts by Thurman Arnold, then the Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, to challenge 
domestic and international cartels that used patent licenses as coordination mechanisms.79 
Much of what we know about the early use of patent licensing as a collusive device comes 
from government cases initiated in the 1930s and from the TNEC proceedings. 
In addition to agency reports and congressional hearings, government litigation in the 
mid-twentieth century reflected a larger effort to bring antitrust law to bear on collusive, 
patent-based schemes. During this time period, the DOJ prosecuted a variety of antitrust 
cases in which patent practices provided crucial means for executing improper collusive 
schemes.80 We highlight three factual scenarios involving allegations of illegal concerted 
action involving patents in litigated cases: patent pools, cross-licenses, and price 
restrictions. 81  The illustrative cases below do not expressly address the special 
anticompetitive possibilities presented by patenting activity and patent practices in the 
                                                 
78 FORMATION OF THE POSTWAR PERIOD, supra note 29, at 96–107. 
79 Id. at 83–89. By the late 1930s, the DOJ had given high priority to investigating the use of patents 
as collusive and exclusionary mechanisms. ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF 
MONOPOLY 368–70 (1966) (describing DOJ efforts to scrutinize “the use of patent laws to create and 
perpetuate monopolistic strongholds.”). Arnold testified on behalf of the DOJ Antitrust Division before the 
TNEC body at the close of its proceedings. TNEC FINAL REPORT, supra note 75, at 98–138. At several points, 
he emphasized how the DOJ was working to prosecute cartels in sectors that supplied vital means for the 
wartime mobilization. Id. at 99 (testimony of Thurman Arnold stating that “expenditures for national defense 
have imposed the immediate task on the Antitrust Division of breaking up combinations which are restricting 
production in national-defense industries or which are causing the Government to pay artificial prices for its 
defense materials.”). 
80 For notable examples of government antitrust cases in this period that attacked patent practices as 
illegal agreements under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1980), or as conspiracies to 
monopolize under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1980), see infra notes 85–91, 100–04, 124–
25 and accompanying text.   
81 A separate body of cases, not treated in this paper, has focused on patenting behavior as a form 
of illegal, single-firm misconduct. The leading patent-antitrust cases of this category are analyzed in F. M. 
Scherer, Technological Innovation and Monopolization (John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t, Harvard Univ., 
Faculty Research Working Papers Series, No. RWP07-043, Oct. 2007) [hereinafter Technological Innovation 
and Monopolization]. 




context of serial collusion by multi-product firms, yet their fact patterns and analysis are 
consistent with some of the serial collusion concerns we address in Sections III and IV.  
 
Scenario 1: Patent Pools and Cross-Licensing 
Some antitrust cases have challenged patent pools on the ground that the contested 
pooling arrangements facilitated industry-wide coordination of output and pricing. One 
notable illustration is Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. United States.82 In the case, several 
petroleum refiners held patents on a new catalytic cracking process that enabled refiners to 
extract a larger amount of higher valued products (e.g., gasoline) from a barrel of crude 
oil.83 To avoid litigation over their competing claims, the firms pooled their patents, cross-
licensed to each other, and agreed to share royalties received from licenses under the 
patents in a fixed proportion. The DOJ claimed the arrangement enabled the refiners to 
eliminate competition among the patentees over royalty rates. Applying a rule of reason 
test, the Supreme Court upheld the participants’ cross-licensing and royalty division 
practices. The Court wrote that the challenged practices often are necessary to prevent 
infringement litigation from blocking technical progress and concluded that the royalty 
division mechanism could not adversely affect prices because gasoline produced from the 
use of the patented cracking technology constituted only 26 percent of all gasoline output.84  
Two features of the Standard Oil (Indiana) decision are interesting for our purposes. 
First, the Court took an expansive view of the benefits of the settlements that supported the 
patent pool and seemed less sensitive to, or unaware of, their anticompetitive possibilities, 
including their tendency to suppress challenges to the validity of weak patents. For serial 
colluders, the aura of legitimacy that surrounds patent settlements might increase the 
                                                 
82 283 U.S. 163 (1931). 
83 Catalytic cracking represented an important advance in refining technology. Before cracking 
became commonplace, refineries relied mainly on distillation units that separated hydrocarbons by boiling 
crude oil and using fractionation towers to separate components of different densities and boiling points. The 
Petroleum Industry: Hearings on S. 2387 and related bills Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly 
of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., Part 3, at 2143–44 (1975) (testimony of Frederic M. Scherer 
regarding vertical integration in the petroleum industry).   
84 By treating distillation and cracking as fungible, the Court underestimated the significance of 
cracking. Because it gave refiners important cost advantages, cracking likely constituted a distinct relevant 
market. Seen that way, the share of output covered by the challenged patent arrangements would have been 
over 50 percent (instead of a 26 percent share of all gasoline output).  




attractiveness of such agreements as a means to create or reinforce the structures vital to 
cartel success. Second, the Standard (Indiana) decision notes that pooling and settlements 
may be inevitable and essential to achieving economic progress where many firms engage 
in patenting related to a specific technology. This raises the question, which we discuss 
below, of whether cartel members might strategically strive to obtain as many patents as 
possible as one way to create a nexus of conflicting rights that only can be resolved by 
agreement among rivals who own these rights. In other words, intensive patenting can 
create the condition that necessitates pooling and related settlements, and these 
arrangements can provide useful cartel administration infrastructure.   
Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States provides a second, important illustration of the 
competitive concerns that can arise in pooling and cross-licensing arrangements.85 This 
case dealt with the use of patents to implement price fixing by glass manufacturers. In the 
first half of the twentieth century, glass manufacturing was a competitive and 
technologically progressive industry. Process innovation during this period allowed for 
automation of most manufacturing activities. However, the industry moved toward 
collusion when two key players, Hartford and a Corning subsidiary named Empire, settled 
patent litigation and reached a cross-license agreement in 1916. Subsequently, Hartford 
and Owens (another glass manufacturer) settled patent litigation in 1924, then jointly 
bought up most remaining glassmaking patents from other manufacturers. With Corning, 
Hartford and Owens at the core of the patent cross-licensing agreements, most 
manufacturers were organized into a cartel that relied on product market division. Corning 
enjoyed an exclusive license to make certain kinds of blown glass, Owens-Illinois had the 
exclusive right to make pressed glass using the suction process, and Thatcher held the 
exclusive right to make milk bottles.86 The licenses for fruit jars went to Ball and Owens-
Illinois, and eventually to Hazel-Atlas. Hazel-Atlas resisted the manufacturers’ cartel for 
several years but joined in 1932 to settle patent litigation. 
Making its case, the DOJ accused the several glass manufacturer defendants of 
conspiring to fix prices and monopolize the market for glass making. At the time of the 
suit, 96% of U.S. glass output was made using glass machinery licenses: Hartford owned 
                                                 
85 323 U.S. 386 (1945). 
86 Id. at 396–400 




more than 600 patents, Corning owned more than 100, Hazel owned more than 70, Owens 
owned more than 60, and Lynch owned 12.87 All of these patents were merged into a pool 
that effectively permitted defendants to control industry output and pricing.88 On certiorari, 
the Supreme Court upheld the district court’s ruling that the patent licensing agreements 
violated the Sherman Act.89 The remedy required the defendants to offer a reasonable 
royalty on their patents going forward and blocked future use of patent license terms that 
could facilitate collusion.90 
Analyzing the result in Hartford-Empire, it is easy to see the risk of collusion created 
by aggressive patent acquisition and enforcement coupled with licensing terms that allocate 
product markets. This result also differs from that of the aircraft manufacturing patent pool, 
described in the Curtiss and the Wright brothers example above. Whereas the glass patent 
pool and airplane patents both tied up a significant portion of the relevant industry, the 
airplane patents covered fundamental technologies and represented blocking patents as to 
each other. By contrast, the glass patent pool covered relatively pedestrian inventions. 
Thus, the Court’s finding of anticompetitive effect and imposition of required licensing at 
reasonable rates is a sensible result in Hartford-Empire. Our assessment of Hartford-
Empire would be different if we were convinced that key patents in the pool were 
technologically significant and mutually blocking.91 
The Hartford-Empire case facts also suggest ways in which the benefits of patent 
licenses to cartels are magnified when the colluding firms pool their patents and establish 
                                                 
87 Id.  
88 Id. at 398. 
89 Id. at 401–02. 
90 Id. at 413–14. 
91 Our sentiment here parallels recent policy in the DOJ and FTC that looks favorably at pools 
containing only “standard essential patents.” By definition, such patents cover significant and complementary 
technology related to computers and communications. The DOJ issued business review letters “that endorse 
a policy of ex ante price disclosure at VITA (an SSO that promotes the VMEbus computer architecture) and 
the IEEE. The VITA policy requires IP holders to commit to a ‘price cap’ (i.e. a maximum royalty rate and 
most restrictive set of licensing terms), which can be amended downwards, while the IEEE policy allows 
firms to disclose their most restrictive licensing terms on a voluntary basis.” Timothy Simcoe, Can Standard 
Setting Organizations Address Patent Hold-up? Comments for The Federal Trade Commission 13 (2011) 
(internal citation omitted), http://people.bu.edu/tsimcoe/documents/working/Simcoe-FTC-SSO-Comments-
v2.pdf (prepared comment for 2011 FTC conference on the topic of tools to prevent “hold-up” issues created 
by patents. See also Tools to Prevent Patent “Hold-up”: IP Rights in Standard Setting, FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2011/06/tools-prevent-patent-hold-ip-rights-standard-
setting (last accessed May 15, 2021) (with links to download all submitted comments at the 2011 FTC 
conference, including that of Timothy Simcoe).  




an independent entity to administer the pool. A vertical licensor-licensee relationship 
between an upstream and downstream firm is less likely to be subjected to antitrust 
scrutiny92 because vertical agreements are subject to a more permissive standard of review 
that considers procompetitive justifications from firm coordination. 93  By contrast, 
agreements among horizontal competitors to fix prices, set output levels, divide territories, 
or allocate customers are generally treated as per se illegal, as they are thought to have a 
greater potential to cause social harm. 94  Yet, the disparate treatment of vertical and 
horizontal agreements can be questionable when the upstream pool manager is working for 
the downstream licensees who hope to achieve a cartel in their market. In these cases, the 
upstream actor may merely be coordinating horizontal dealing in a “hub-and-spoke” 
arrangement without providing procompetitive benefits to the market.95 Nevertheless, it is 
hard for courts and enforcers to distinguish desirable pool managers who offer one-stop 
licensing of a vast portfolio of patents from those who simply work to promote a licensees’ 
cartel.96 
                                                 
92 Herbert Hovenkamp & Christopher R. Leslie, The Firm as Cartel Manager, 64 VAND. L. REV. 
813, 842 (2011) [hereinafter Cartel Manager] (noting that vertical communication is less likely to attract the 
attention of anti-cartel enforcers). 
93 Douglas H. Ginsburg et al., Antitrust and Intellectual Property in the United States and the 
European Union, in THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN COMPETITION LAW AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY—AN 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 99, 103 (Gariella Muscolo & Marina Tavassi eds., 2019); see also Leegin 
Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 907 (2007) (“Vertical price restraints are to be 
judged according to the rule of reason.”). 
94 Ginsburg et al., supra note 93, at 105–06; see also United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 
364, 388–89 (1948) (condemning arrangement by which rivals pooled patents to produce gypsum and agreed 
to take a license setting royalties by a common formula and fixing the downstream price of gypsum products); 
United States v. Nat’l Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 325–28 (1947) (banning patent cross-licensing scheme that 
divided global markets). 
95 Federal antitrust agencies have challenged a number of these hub-and-spoke arrangements in 
settings that did not involve patents. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939); United 
States v. Apple Inc., 791 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2015); Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2000). 
96 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Competition Committee 
has identified this concern when describing FTC enforcement experience in the 1990s: 
The main concern regarding cross-licensing and pooling arrangements is that they can be 
used to cover up a collusive agreement by mechanisms such as the joint marketing of 
pooled intellectual property rights with collective price setting or coordinated output 
restrictions that do not contribute to an efficiency-enhancing integration of economic 
activity among the participants. Such anticompetitive effects are more likely to occur when 
the IP rights being cross-licensed or pooled comprise substitute technologies, i.e. the IP 
rights’ holders are potential competitors in a horizontal relationship. . . . A 
contemporaneous example can be observed in the [United States], where the FTC 
challenged a pool of patents relating to the manufacture and use of lasers employed in 




 There are several other ways that patent pools can facilitate cartels. These are not 
directly addressed in the Hartford-Empire decision, but they emerge as implications that 
cartel members—especially serial colluders—might derive from the glass cartel 
experience. One benefit is that combining the patent portfolios of the members creates a 
bigger stick to punish deviators and deter entry. 97  A second advantage is that buyer 
resistance to higher cartel prices may be reduced if sellers in the cartel can deceive buyers 
and attribute price increases to the royalties imposed by the pool, which supposedly are out 
of sellers’ control. 
 
Scenario 2: Price Restrictions 
A second distinct category of antitrust case law has wrestled with the question of 
whether a patentee may control the price at which its licensees can sell a product making 
use of the patented technology. In the early years of the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court 
in E. Bement & Sons v. National Harrow Co. took the position that a patentee may enforce 
minimum price clauses in its licenses. 98  The Court reasoned that because it had no 
obligation to license its patent, the patentee had the right to condition the grant of a license 
upon the licensee’s agreement to sell the patented good at or above a designated price. 
Thus, the Court permitted an explicit price restraint so long as it was incorporated into a 
patent licensing agreement.  
                                                 
performing eye surgeries in 1998. The two companies comprising the pool were the only 
firms whose laser equipment had obtained the marketing approval from the U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration for performing the surgery. Through the pool, Summit and VISX 
relinquished the right to license their patents unilaterally, but each received the right to 
prohibit the pool from licensing [to] any third party. The pool issued no third-party licences 
[sic] over its six-year existence. In addition, the pool agreement required the payment of a 
minimum fee for each procedure performed with its laser equipment, i.e. the pool set a 
price floor for the “per-procedure fee” that each company charged ophthalmologists using 
its equipment. The FTC alleged that the pool eliminated competition between the pool 
members in the sale or leasing of the laser equipment and in the licensing of related 
technology. The FTC’s allegations concerning the pool were settled through consent orders 
that dissolved the agreement. 
OECD, DIRECTORATE FOR FINANCIAL AND ENTERPRISE AFFAIRS COMPETITION COMMITTEE, Licensing of IP 
Rights and Competition Law 25–26 (June 6, 2019), 
https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP(2019)3/en/pdf [hereinafter Licensing of IP Rights]. 
97 About 15% of chemical patents are traded. Carlos J. Serrano, The Dynamics of the Transfer and 
Renewal of Patents, 41 RAND J. ECON. 686, 693 (2010). 
98 186 U.S. 70 (1902). 




 In United States v. General Electric Co., the Supreme Court rejected a DOJ 
challenge to a patent licensing agreement between General Electric (GE) and 
Westinghouse that enabled Westinghouse to produce and sell incandescent lamps covered 
by GE’s patents.99 The DOJ attacked a licensing provision that required Westinghouse to 
set prices for its lamps at the same levels that GE set for its own distributors. The Court 
reasoned that the restriction was a reasonable method for GE to achieve an appropriate 
return on its investment in developing its lamp technology. The Court did not consider 
other less benign motivations, such as the use of the licensing provision to support 
coordination between the two firms. And, if GE’s patents were infirm, the license could 
help ensure that the company’s chief rival (Westinghouse) would not contest their validity. 
The pricing term thus could assist the two companies in coordinating the output and pricing 
of electric lamps. 
 On many subsequent occasions, the DOJ has brought cases to challenge the rule of 
General Electric.100 The agency has succeeded in limiting the rule; however, it has not 
convinced the Supreme Court to repudiate it. In United States v. Masonite Corp.,101 the 
DOJ persuaded the Supreme Court to strike down licenses where the patentee had set the 
price at which its licensees sold products making use of its patent. The Court treated the 
arrangement as a traditional horizontal price-fixing conspiracy and emphasized that, unlike 
the circumstances of General Electric, Masonite did all of the manufacturing for its 
licensees, which distributed the patented product at the price set by Masonite. Later in the 
same decade as Masonite, the DOJ again invited the Supreme Court to overrule General 
Electric. In United States v. Line Material, 102  the DOJ challenged a cross-licensing 
agreement where the holders of a “basic patent” and an “improvement patent” licensed 
their technologies to each other and imposed a price limitation of the type that the Court 
had approved in General Electric. The defendants argued that the cross-licensing 
arrangement was necessary to overcome a commonplace patent blocking problem. In 
                                                 
99 272 U.S. 476 (1926). 
100 These efforts are recounted in HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST, supra note 6, at 541–54; 
UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST 
LAWS 233–36 (Mar. 31, 1955). 
101 316 U.S. 265 (1942). 
102 333 U.S. 287 (1948). 




upholding the DOJ’s complaint, the Court distinguished General Electric on the ground 
that the two patentees had engaged in a “combination” and that such combinations violated 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.103 The erosion of General Electric continued in United 
States v. New Wrinkle, Inc.,104 where the Supreme Court barred a price restraint contained 
in the license of pooled patents assigned to a holding company. Unlike in Line Material, 
the patents in questions were substitutes and not complements. The Court distinguished 
General Electric on the ground that the licensing mechanism was a holding company that 
acted on behalf of the contributors to the patent pool.  
 In sum, patent holders remain able to set prices for their licensees’ products making 
use of the patent, but they are mostly limited to the facts of General Electric if they try to 
do so. This provides uncertain protection to firms seeking to invoke the shelter of General 
Electric.105 That said, patent holders remain able to set royalty rates in their licensing 
agreements that functionally allow them to retain a good deal of control over market output 
and pricing. 
B. Patent Practices as Sources of Cartel Stability Though Not Always a Total 
Solution for Cartel Coordination 
The government’s investigation of patent practices and the records of prosecuted 
cases illuminate the capacity of licensing terms to enhance cartel stability. In many 
historical cases, patents played a simple role in price-fixing agreements: licenses set caps 
on or restricted output by means of territorial, customer, or field-of-use restrictions. In 
some cases, the licenses specified prices or restricted price-setting.106 In these examples, 
                                                 
103 This distinction has mystified generations of commentators. See, e.g., WARD S. BOWMAN, JR., 
PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC APPRAISAL 195 (1973) (critiquing the Court’s 
efforts in Line Material to distinguish General Electric, stating “A more arbitrary and unprincipled per se 
rule would be difficult to construct.”). 
104 342 U.S. 371 (1952). 
105 See HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST, supra note 6, at 543 (“Analytically deficient, as it 
is, it is not surprising that the status of General Electric is clouded by the criticism which it has evoked and 
the stinginess with which it has been construed. Though in some sense the case remains law, one cannot rely 
on it in counseling . . . . The alacrity with which courts have distinguished General Electric and the fact that 
since 1926 no majority of the Supreme Court has been ready to affirm it serve warning that even narrowly 
read, the case provides no basis for planning a licensing program.”). 
106 See also Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REV. 515, 604–05 
(2004) (describing the use of patent licenses to stabilize price-fixing agreements). 




patents were helpful tools to enable firms to form and maintain a cartel, although they were 
often also violative of antitrust law.  
 Unexplained, however, is why prosecuted cartels would put in place pricing, 
allocation, and enforcement structures with co-conspirators if they can suppress rivalry 
through legally enforceable patent licenses alone. Presumably, it could be the case that 
many unobserved cartels are run only or mainly with patent licenses. Thus, enforcement 
cases might be skewed toward fact sets where firms adopt more explicit coordinating 
conduct. But this still begs the question as to why we see so many prosecuted colluders 
implement cartel structures with measures that extend well beyond patent licenses. We 
offer three possible explanations below. 
First, agreements that are designed to encumber interfirm rivalry will be inherently 
incomplete. Specifically, many unanticipated circumstances will arise that will cause 
colluding firms to enter into discussions to reaffirm cartel structures and ensure compliance 
with the agreement. Incomplete contracts are not unique to cartel agreements,107 but said 
agreements are not legally enforceable. Thus, the incompleteness issues that arise are likely 
to be more extensive than for a legally enforceable contract. Because patent licenses are 
legally enforceable, they would seem to be a partial solution to this problem. This may 
explain, at least in part, their prevalence in cartel agreements. Yet, like any other contract, 
the incompleteness of even patent license agreements requires discussion by cartel 
members regarding unforeseen circumstances. 
Second, patent licenses in mature product markets or industries are probably best used 
for coarse components of the cartel structures. For example, European and Japanese 
chemical firms may license to each other with the intent of creating a geographic division 
across their two markets. But patent license agreements are unlikely to have enough 
specificity to, say, delineate price increases twice a year by licensees as well as articulate 
the rationale that will be offered to buyers regarding the justifications for these price 
increases. 
Third, diffusing buyer resistance is crucial to the success of a cartel. For example, as 
cartel participants restrain output and drive up prices, buyers will attempt to lure cartel 
                                                 
107 Jean Tirole, Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?, 67 ECONOMETRICA 741 (1999). 




members into offering lower prices for a greater volume of business. This may lead to 
cheating on the cartel agreement. In this and many other ways, buyers can resist price 
increases, and it would be a difficult task to write a fully contingent license agreement that 
anticipated all such attempts. In practice, many communications between cartel members 
are about thwarting buyer resistance. 
Overall, patents can facilitate cartel formation and stability. In some cases, however, 
cartel meetings and structures may still be necessary. In other cases, it is possible that 
experienced colluders, who make nearly the entirety of industry output for a product, can 
accomplish the suppression of rivalry primarily through use of patent licenses where 
ongoing discussions about license terms are nothing more than disguised cartel meetings. 
C. Patents and the Evasion of Antitrust Scrutiny 
As introduced above, past enforcement experience suggests a number of ways in which 
patent practices can assist cartel members in avoiding detection and prosecution. In 
general, patent licenses provide a cloak of apparent legitimacy to the interaction of 
competitors that otherwise would raise regulators’ suspicions. Patent licensing also 
presents an opportunity for cartel members to speak frankly about inputs and prices, create 
cartel evasion penalties, and pass off coordinating conduct to internal actors as legitimate 
business activity. 
In a non-collusive setting, the owner of a patent on a valuable invention ordinarily can 
refuse to license its new technology.108 To avoid this holdup problem, the law gives the 
patent owner a measure of protection from antitrust law to encourage licensing.109 Certain 
field-of-use, territorial, or customer exclusivity provisions that might raise regulatory flags 
outside of the patent licensing context may be permitted. Yet, colluding firms can mimic 
                                                 
108 Ginsburg et al., supra note 93, at 107–08. 
109  A policy paper prepared by the OECD Competition Committee Secretariat has identified the 
competitively ambiguous nature of such licensing practices:  
Field-of-use, territorial or customer exclusivity raise antitrust concerns mainly if there is a 
horizontal relationship among licensors, among licensees, or between the licensor and its 
licensee(s). At the same time, . . . it is widely accepted that such restraints may serve 
procompetitive ends. It follows that a finding of whether such clauses infringe competition 
law depends on the balancing of pro- and anticompetitive effects.  
OECD, Licensing of IP, supra note 96, at 19. 




the practices of non-collusive patent licensors to achieve their anticompetitive goals.110 
Even outside of the patent context, these types of restraints on trade may have been the 
goal of collusive firms. Seeking licensing arrangements to achieve these ends, then, 
provides protection from antitrust enforcement without societal benefit.  
Further, the processes for negotiating and enforcing licensing agreements can afford 
valuable advantages to cartel members. In order to reach an agreement on licensing terms, 
parties may be willing to share information about input costs and pricing that would 
otherwise be impermissible for rivals to share.111 The meetings in which parties negotiate 
licensing terms are facially legitimate and thus do not have to be kept secret, though the 
terms agreed upon usually are kept secret.112  
Patent licensing schemes may also be part of a larger cartel maintenance strategy. 
Licensors often impose audit provisions to ensure licensees cannot evade paying royalties 
that are sometimes calculated as a percentage of sales or a fee based on output.113 A 
collusive patent licensor can use this audit mechanism to detect and discourage cheating 
                                                 
110 The same OECD policy paper observes: 
Licensing arrangements can nonetheless pose competitive risks. Foremost among these is 
the risk of cartelisation [sic], which can arise whenever the agreement is between actual or 
potential competitors in a given market. Collusion can take place in the market for products 
manufactured using the licensed technology or in the market for the licensed technology 
itself. In the market for products manufactured using the licensed technology, cartel 
agreements between licensees can be implemented by ostensibly vertical distribution 
agreements, e.g. by inducing licensors to impose resale price maintenance and thus fixing 
prices at the licensee level. Vertical price fixing may also contribute to the stability of a 
cartel arrangement at the licensor level by making the licensors’ retail prices more 
transparent and stable.  
Id. at 15. 
111  As Professor Priest noted in his groundbreaking paper on patent licensing as a means for 
collusion, U.S. patent laws have been interpreted to give licensors “broad authority to set licensee output, to 
allocate licensee territories, and even to fix minimum licensee prices.” Priest, supra note 6, at 309. These 
interpretations give actual or potential rivals a legitimate reason to exchange sensitive information that could 
raise serious antitrust concerns outside the setting of patent licensing.  
112 Cartel Manager, supra note 92, at 842 (suggesting that the risk of cartel detection increases as 
communication between competitors increases). 
113  See RUSSELL L. PARR, ROYALTY RATES FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 187–96 (2007) 
(describing mechanisms for auditing and monitoring of fulfillment of royalty terms in licensing agreements 
for patents and other forms of intellectual property). 




on cartel rules. Licenses may also have termination or penalty provisions that could be 
invoked by a licensor to punish a firm that deviated from cartel rules.114 
In addition to the benefit of having output restrictions that are legally enforceable, 
patent licenses may serve a valuable internal function to avoid raising compliance concerns 
with in-house counsel or a firm’s board of directors. Specifically, each cartel firm can 
“explain” to counsel and its sales force that restrictions on where to sell, how much to sell, 
and pricing are part of patent license agreements with rivals as opposed to revealing a 
cartel.115 Clever cartel managers have the opportunity to coordinate multiple licenses with 
fellow colluders to induce desired output restrictions while hiding the operation of the 
cartel in plain sight, even from fellow employees. Outside counsel can be used to draft the 
licenses without raising ethical concerns, as they are less likely to know the industry well 
enough to recognize the collusive purpose of these agreements. And the board of directors 
will avoid knowledge of illegal activity that would typically require a board’s response.  
 
                                                 
114 See Ian Ayres, How Cartels Punish: A Structural Theory of Self-Enforcing Collusion, 87 COLUM. L. 
REV. 295, 318 (1987). Professor Ayres analyzes the behavior of General Electric and Westinghouse in the 
early twentieth century light bulb industry and describes:   
[C]onsider the opportunities for including binding punishment threats in sham patent 
licenses. Such opportunities are illustrated in the General Electric/Westinghouse light bulb 
license. In 1912, General Electric granted to Westinghouse patent licenses for the 
manufacture and sale of light bulbs. The license required Westinghouse to maintain the 
price that General Electric charged for bulbs and to pay a royalty of two per cent [sic] of 
net sales—which rose, however, to 10 per cent [sic] if Westinghouse’s net sales exceeded 
15 percent of General Electric-Westinghouse total net sales.  
George Priest has suggested that the license agreement might have been used to fix price: “A 
royalty of 2 per cent indicates either that the patent was trivial and the parties were simply 
price-fixers, or that General Electric was distributing patent rents in return for an agreement to 
fix price and limit output.” The increasing royalty is especially relevant to the issue of 
punishment. For if General Electric’s patent were invalid and the license agreement were 
entered solely to facilitate collusion, then the escalating royalty would punish price-chiseling. 
Westinghouse would be deterred from giving secret price cuts in order to increase its output 
beyond the 15 percent market share that triggered the punishment royalty, which was five 
times higher. 
Id. at 318. 
115 Aggressive sales representatives often cause fights within cartels, as through making excess 
sales, they can cause a firm to cheat on cartel rules. Absent the patent license, evidence that a firm openly 
punished an aggressive sales force could be used as evidence of price fixing. 




III. ECONOMICS OF EXPLICIT COLLUSION WITH EXTENSION TO SERIAL 
COLLUDERS’ PATENT ACTIVITY116  
In the previous section, we suggested that past antitrust enforcement experience yields 
insights about how patent licensing practices can provide valuable means for effective 
cartel management—for example, by providing instruments to formulate and adjust 
collusive agreements, by increasing opportunities for communication in contexts that 
generally do not attract suspicion, and making the punishment of cheaters and deterrence 
of entrants more credible. In the following sections, we take care to distinguish how 
encounters across multiple markets makes collusion easier and more effective as compared 
to single market collusion. In particular, we lay out how patents play new roles or are more 
effective in facilitating cartelization in the serial collusion context as compared to the single 
market setting. First, we review the economics of explicit collusion, starting with the basics 
and recalling our analysis from our earlier work regarding serial colluders, and then extend 
that analysis to include the use of patents by serial colluders.  
A. Basics of the Economics of Explicit Collusion 
Under what circumstances does an industry have a proclivity for explicit collusion?117 
A proclivity for collusion indicates that there are characteristics of the industry that result 
in a potential substantial payoff from explicit collusion by participant firms. Michael 
Porter’s Five Forces Model (PFF) provides a compelling way to understand this proclivity. 
Figure 5: Adapted Graphic of Michael Porter’s Five Forces118 
 
 
                                                 
116 The arguments and analyses in this section are largely drawn from George J. Stigler, A Theory 
of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44 (1964) and ROBERT C. MARSHALL & LESLIE M. MARX, THE ECONOMICS 
OF COLLUSION: CARTELS AND BIDDING RINGS (2012) [hereinafter ECONOMICS OF COLLUSION]. 
117 A definition of “industry” offered by Michael Porter in 1979 is a “group of competitors producing 
substitutes that are close enough that the behavior of any firm affects each of the others either directly or 
indirectly.” Michael E. Porter, The Structure within Industries and Companies’ Performance, 61 REV. ECON. 
& STATISTICS 214, 215 (1979). 
118 ECONOMICS OF COLLUSION, supra note 116, at 94 fig.5.1. Reprinted with permission of MIT 
Press.  











PFF identifies the forces that impact the profitability of an industry. The center force is 
interfirm rivalry. Going clockwise from the top, other forces include the threat of new 
entry, bargaining power of buyers, possibility of substitute products, and bargaining power 
of suppliers. The following conditions imply that the perimeter forces are conducive to 
high profits for the industry: little threat of entry, limited bargaining power of buyers, few 
close substitute goods, and limited bargaining power of suppliers. If these conditions are 
met, then the primary detriment to the profits of the industry will be interfirm rivalry. This 
implies that an agreement among producers to suppress interfirm rivalry can be quite 
profitable, provided that the agreement anticipates the primary challenges of explicit 
collusion: members cheating on the cartel scheme and external actors making adjustments 
to cartelization of the market.119 
First, for explicit collusion to be effective, the agreement must mitigate secret 
deviations by the cartel members. Each member will want to cheat on the agreement by 
secretly selling to buyers at prices that somewhat undercut the cartel and at a greater 
volume than they would otherwise sell. To avoid this difficulty, the cartel firms must adopt 
structures addressing challenges on three fronts: pricing, allocation, and enforcement.120 A 
pricing structure provides for the coordinated elevation of prices or restriction in quantities 
by the members of the cartel. An allocation structure provides for an agreed upon division 
of the collusive gain. An enforcement structure provides for the accurate monitoring of 
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120 ECONOMICS OF COLLUSION, supra note 116, at 105–138. 




prices and/or quantities by the members of the cartel as well as the specification of the 
negative consequence for intentionally cheating on the cartel agreement.  
Second—external actor adjustment. Let’s return to PFF and consider what effects a 
successful cartel will have on the market. Even if the perimeter forces in PFF were not a 
threat to the profitability of the relevant market before explicit collusion, as a cartel elevates 
profits, perimeter forces may place a greater strain on cartel participants: increased profits 
will lure new entrants, spur buyers to be more aggressive in bargaining on price, and induce 
buyers to seek out substitute products. Increased industry profits may also induce suppliers 
with bargaining power to use that power to extract some of the incremental profits of the 
cartel through higher factor input prices.121 In addition, if the cartel is not all-inclusive of 
firms in the market, then the non-cartel firms will seek to undercut cartel pricing and 
increase their own market shares, thereby freeriding on the protective pricing umbrella of 
the cartel and cutting away at its price stability. 
B. The Comparative Advantage of Serial Colluders in Cartel Management 
All effective cartels confront these internal challenges. First-time colluders lack 
experience on how to deal with these issues and thus may settle for only modest profit 
elevation from their cartels. Further, cartel firms that make only a single product or that are 
only colluding in a single product market will be forced to address these issues within the 
stovepipe of that single market cartel. However, large multi-product firms that are, and 
have been, managing a portfolio of cartels are in a fundamentally better position to 
implement and maintain their cartel. There are several reasons that serial colluders stand at 
an advantage: 
● Serial colluders are experienced at initiating and managing cartels. This experience 
matters in terms of the effectiveness of any cartel, as well as keeping it clandestine 
from buyers and avoiding detection by enforcement authorities.122 
● Serial colluders have lots of cartel-specific internal human capital embodied in 
senior managers who have run successful cartels in the earlier parts of their careers. 
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122 Modern antitrust policy relies heavily on leniency and other innovations in detection. Antitrust 
enforcement authorities seem to perceive that such measures have greatly impaired explicit collusion. In our 




Senior managers who are experienced at initiating and managing cartels are familiar 
with how to address the issues associated with the consequent relative weakening 
of the perimeter forces from effective explicit collusion. Senior managers with 
cartel-specific human capital have existing relationships with their counterparts at 
other serial colluders.  
● Serial colluders have gained an understanding about which firms are likely to be 
reliable, trustworthy partners in collusive schemes, thus can choose effective cartel 
partners with limited risk of cartel defection. 
● Serial colluders may have acquired experience by virtue of past law enforcement 
inquiries about how to anticipate and respond to antitrust investigations and 
lawsuits, thereby lessening the threat of agency enforcement. 
By contrast, first time colluders, and/or smaller firms that are managing a single cartel do 
not enjoy these advantages.  
In support of the comparative advantage that serial colluders enjoy when architecting 
or enforcing a cartel, we present three strands of evidence from the chemical industry. First, 
serial colluders in the chemical industry are familiar with common facilitating practices, 
such as organizing cartel activity through a neutral middleman. Each of the serial colluders 
in the chemical industry has used the services of Fides/AC Treuhand to facilitate the 
explicit collusion structures in at least one of the cartels that they participated in. 
Knowledge of the cartel facilitation services provided by Fides/AC Treuhand, and the 
ability to access those services, is inconsistent with the rogue division manager scenario 
and consistent with the portfolio of cartels/business model scenario. First-time cartel 
participants might not be aware of market actors like Fides/AC Treuhand, thus may take 
on excess costs and risks to stand up a cartel. 
Second, serial colluders in the chemical industry are familiar with cartel exit and re-
alignment strategies. In the midst of several chemical industry cartel periods, some firms 
                                                 
view, the enforcement community’s confidence in the effectiveness of leniency underestimates the 
adaptability and ingenuity of cartel firms. In particular, we find serial colluders to be enormously creative in 
addressing a myriad of cartel issues and using enforcement “innovations” to their advantage, if it is at all 
possible to do so. See, e.g., Leslie M. Marx et al., Antitrust Leniency with Multiproduct Colluders, 7 AM. 
ECON. J. 205 (2015). 




exited by selling their product division to another firm that would continue to participate 
in the cartel. To exit a cartel when high profits are being earned and antitrust liability 
already exists is inconsistent with the rogue division manager scenario and consistent with 
the management of a portfolio of cartels. In particular, this conduct suggests that firms may 
be exiting one cartel and having their entry into other cartels accommodated.  
Third, serial colluders in the chemical industry are familiar with mechanisms to punish 
troubling fringe parties in order to preserve cartel profits. Firms have applied for amnesty 
to signal to smaller cartel participants across their portfolio of cartels that they will not 
tolerate deviant conduct. 123 Again, this is inconsistent with a rogue division manager 
scenario and consistent with a serial colluder running a portfolio of cartels.  
In sum, the chemical industry example suggests that serial colluders stand at an 
advantage to their peers when it comes to maintaining and managing a cartel. This 
advantage is only magnified in the multi-product context. Next, we discuss how patents 
and patent licensing fit into cartel maintenance.  
C. Serial Colluders Using Patents to Manage Their Portfolio of Cartels  
How do patents and patent licensing help a serial colluder manage a portfolio of cartels? 
When viewed solely in the context of a single cartel, a surge in patent activity from the pre-
plea to the plea period can create a substantial entry barrier for non-cartel firms regardless 
of whether the cartel firm is a serial colluder. By comparison, the surge in patent activity 
by non-producing serial colluders is a phenomenon that may play a unique role in the 
context of serial collusion. At a high level, patent licensing strategies can assist cartels in 
making investments that sustain the structures necessary for the success of a collusive 
scheme. The investments that serial colluders might make to enhance industry-wide profits 
are likely to occur to a much fuller extent when serial colluders generate patents and patent 
licenses across a range of products. By contrast, firms might underinvest in such activities 
                                                 
123 If firms A and B participate in cartels in both markets 1 and 2, and if firm B defected from the 
cartel agreement in market 2, then firm A could punish firm B, by disclosing the market 1 cartel to 
enforcement authorities and applying for amnesty. Firm B would likely suffer from sanctions resulting 
from enforcement in market 1. Firm A might take this step if collusive profit in market 1 is small compared 
to collusive profit in market 2, especially if firm A thinks firm B and other potential defectors will be 
deterred from further cheating in market 2.  Serial Collusion, supra note 14, at 334–36. 




if they treat each cartel as a stovepipe. Thus, where serial colluders are managing a portfolio 
of cartels, we would expect that there will be much more investment in these profit 
enhancing actions.124 
Additionally, serial colluders, being experienced at cartel activity and wanting to 
facilitate the management of a portfolio of cartels, likely see other advantages from a surge 
in patent activity in products that they make. These potential advantages are best 
understood when viewed through the lens of PFF and the three cartel structures: 
● Serial colluders can use patents and patent licenses to keep smaller cartel 
participants “in line.” A smaller cartel participant will often chisel on the cartel’s 
allocation structure as it tries to incrementally increase its share of the collusive 
gain. Serial colluders can restrain this conduct by generating a large number of 
patents, licensing to the smaller cartel firm, and then controlling it through the terms 
of that license agreement. Note that the smaller firm may be colluding with the 
serial colluders in a few other products, and the license agreement could cover a 
range of products where the serial colluders have leverage over the smaller cartel 
firm. 
● Serial colluders can use patents and patent licenses to coerce non-cartel rivals to 
join a cartel or to drive them out of the market. A smaller firm that does not want 
to join a cartel can be a substantial irritant to serial colluders. Serial colluders can 
surge patents in a number of products made by the smaller firm, where membership 
in the cartel is essential for the smaller firm to obtain the relevant patent license 
agreements. Note that for serial colluders, leverage may come from patents 
                                                 
124 Our analysis on this point is informed in part by review of judicial decisions that describe how 
successful, long-lived, single object collusive schemes have used patent licenses to establish broad, durable 
control over an industry, and thus motivated cartel participants to invest more heavily in activities that 
increase the effectiveness of their illegal collaboration. One sees a breadth of vision and ambition that is 
missing in one-shot collusion scenarios. For example, in 1943, the DOJ brought civil charges against National 
Lead and DuPont for conspiring to restrain trade and monopolize the market for titanium dioxide. In United 
States v. National Lead Co., the Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s finding that the defendants “have 
utilized their patents which relate to the manufacture and use of titanium pigments and compounds to control 
and regulate the manufacture and sale of titanium pigments and compounds in the United States [and] . . . 
have done so throughout the rest of the world.” 332 U.S. 319, 328 (1947). The Court endorsed the trial court’s 
conclusion that the defendants’ patents “through the agreements in which they are enmeshed and the manner 
in which they have been used, have, in fact, been forged into instruments of domination of an entire industry.” 
Id.  The Court also endorsed the trial court’s additional finding that the exchange of patents between National 
Lead and DuPont “bec[ame] an instrument of restraint, available for use and used, to continue the mastery of 
the market” which the two firms “achieved by means of the illegal international agreement.” Id. 




obtained in products made by the smaller firm but not a product in which the serial 
colluders have a cartel. 
● Serial colluders can use patents and patent licenses to encumber entry and thwart 
capacity expansion by non-cartel firms. In contrast to single product colluders, 
serial colluders can attack a potential entrant on several different product fronts.125 
Serial colluders may also bar expansion for existing firms looking to implement a 
new technology or process as part of its expansion strategy. 
● Serial colluders can use patents and patent licenses to create a fictitious 
competitor, leading buyers to believe that the competitive process is policing the 
market. A serial colluder may invite a frequent co-conspirator to enter a product 
market so that production in that market now appears to be a duopoly. To do so, the 
original monopolist could offer to license its patent technology to the “new entrant.” 
This entry may put the minds of regulators and buyers at ease, because now there 
appears to be “competition.” And, new entrants may stay out of the market instead 
of trying to compete for smaller portions of market share. 
● Serial colluders can use patents related to substitute goods to limit the proliferation 
of these goods. Serial colluders can potentially identify substitute products and 
generate a large number of patents that relate to these products in order to prevent 
substitute product manufacturers from being effective competitors. Serial colluders 
can also use patents to stymie expansion in the substitute product space. 
● Serial colluders can use patents on the processes to make factor inputs for a 
cartelized product to thwart the bargaining power of suppliers, regardless of any 
intent to manufacture or sell upstream inputs. Serial colluders can generate patents 
on factor inputs and use these patents as leverage to secure better terms from 
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Swiss counterpart to cooperate in seeking to forestall a rival’s entry into the U.S. market. Id. at 195–97. 




suppliers. In this way, serial colluders can mitigate supplier bargaining power and 
deter new entry. 
● Serial colluders can use patent licenses to implement intrafirm cartel restrictions 
by, for example, each cartel firm instructing its sales force to emphasize “price 
before volume” so as to be in compliance with the terms of patent license 
agreements. How does a cartel firm comply with the cartel structures while not 
broadly informing its employees that the firm is a member of a cartel? Patent license 
agreements with other cartel firms provide a marvelous avenue for alleviating this 
issue. Consider for example the change in incentives for the sales force of a cartel 
firm from the pursuit of market share strategy before entering the cartel to a “price 
before volume” strategy at the inception of the cartel. Through adopting a “price 
before volume” term in a patent licensing agreement, managers responsible for 
running a cartel do not have to disclose the cartel to other employees. Instead, they 
can simply inform the sales force that new patent licensing agreement mandates 
incremental constraints on what the sales force can do to pitch new accounts. Other 
constraints can be similarly adopted through patent agreements, such as terms that 
state specific territories or customers are off limits to a sales force. Simply put, new 
incremental patent licensing agreements can be used to solve intrafirm 
communication issues without raising internal compliance red flags. 
● Serial colluders can use their patent portfolios to facilitate discussions regarding 
cartel issues. It ordinarily would be highly risky for senior managers at rival firms 
to meet to discuss cartel issues like output, pricing, or cheating by other cartel 
participants. However, there is at least a pretense of legality when managers at rival 
firms meet to discuss their patents and patent licensing agreements, permitting 
colluders to use these negotiations to facilitate cartel communications. Further, as 
a given firm looks over its portfolio of cartels, it might be having issues with a 
specific firm that is a member of several of their cartels, but this firm’s involvement 
is not as ubiquitous as that of their serial colluding co-conspirators. Resolving the 
cartel issues associated with this smaller cartel participant can potentially be 
addressed across a number of cartels. For example, a serial colluder may want to 
suggest that another serial colluder exit a specific cartel by ceasing production of 




the product, allowing the expansion of the smaller cartel firm, and compensate the 
exiting serial colluding firm by accommodating their entry or expansion in another 
cartelized product. The discussion of this kind of reorganization of cartel conduct 
within the cartel portfolio of each firm can be done with apparent legality through 
the discussion of patent licenses as well.  
● Non-producing serial colluders can use patent license agreements to reduce the 
price they pay for the cartel product of other serial colluders. Serial colluding non-
producers are likely aware of the portfolio of cartels that other serial colluders are 
operating. A non-producer may be a purchaser of the product made by the cartel 
firms, but the non-producer wants to pay non-cartel prices for the product. It may 
be difficult for cartel firms to justify within their firm, as well as to third parties, 
why a specific firm received special pricing on a product when others were paying 
a considerably higher price. Patent licenses by the non-producer can resolve this 
issue. Specifically, the non-producer will nominally pay the cartel firms the higher 
cartel price, but their net price will be a non-cartel price as a consequence of the 
licensing payments made by the cartel firms to the serial colluder non-producer. 
● Serial colluders can use patents to redirect potential entrants by surging patents in 
some cartel products but not others. Although patents can be used as an entry 
deterrent by almost any cartel firm, serial colluders can surge patents in a number 
of products that redirect entry ambitions of smaller firms in a direction that better 
suits the collusive profits of the serial colluders. Suppose a smaller potential entrant 
has the potential capacity to enter the market for products 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 and 
believes ex ante that entry is equally profitable in each of these products. Suppose 
serial colluders have all of these products in the portfolio of cartels, but the serial 
colluders realize that entry would have the most serious negative impact on cartel 
profits for products 1, 2, 3, and 4. Then the serial colluding firms would surge 
patents in products 1, 2, 3, and 4, while leaving product 5 without a surge of patent 
activity. Essentially, the serial colluders are inviting the entry effort to be directed 




at product 5. 126  This kind of activity by serial colluders that are managing a 
portfolio of cartels can be undertaken with apparent legality as part of discussions 
regarding patent activity and patent licensing. Note that if the cartel had issues 
managing product 5 because of a difficult, smaller cartel member who was regularly 
cheating on the cartel agreement, then leaving product 5 relatively exposed to a 
threat of entry might be an effective punishment for that firm. 
● Serial colluders can use patent licenses to organize coordination via a neutral third 
party, like several chemical industry participants did with Fides/AC Treuhand. 
Although we have already noted that patent licensing is unlikely to replace the 
myriad of communications and actions needed to manage a given cartel on a regular 
basis, patent licensing does have the potential to implement cartel structures. 
Suppose two serial colluders are the sole makers of a product. The two cartel firms 
recognize the need to monitor one another but neither firm wants the other in their 
production facility, talking to their employees, and potentially trying to recruit away 
top talent. A serial colluder non-producer with patent license agreements with each 
firm, where the license agreements contain audit provisions, may provide a solution 
to the monitoring dilemma. The two cartel firms would thus benefit from an outside 
facilitator to assist with a number of cartel activities, in much the same way that 
Fides/AC Treuhand provided such assistance to many cartels. 
IV. MODERNIZING ANTITRUST DOCTRINE RELATED TO PATENTS AND 
PRICE FIXING IN RESPONSE TO THE THREAT OF SERIAL COLLUSION 
In this Section, we describe how antitrust law, outside of the pay-for-delay context, 
handles allegations of price fixing when patents are involved. A core objective of antitrust 
law is to deter and punish price-fixing cartels to allow for market output and prices to be 
set via competition. As we explained above, the label “price fixing” applies to naked 
agreements to set minimum prices; restrict output; and divide markets by customer, 
product, or territory. A per se rule against price fixing was advanced early in the twentieth 
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century and solidified by the middle of the century in its current form.127 The logic of per 
se condemnation for horizontal restraints—such as price fixing, output restrictions, and the 
allocation of geographic sales territories or customers—is that these types of behavior harm 
competition in the vast majority of cases without offering redeeming procompetitive 
benefits.128 The threshold inquiry for courts in analyzing agreements challenged as illegal 
trade restraints is to characterize the conduct as either suitable for summary condemnation 
or worthy of a more elaborate reasonableness assessment.129 However, because patent 
licensing often serves benign or procompetitive purposes, the characterization process can 
be more difficult when patent licenses are inserted into the fact pattern.130  
From 1900 to 1950, a number of cases challenging patent licensing arrangements as 
horizontal price fixing came before the courts. Some treated the contested arrangements 
leniently. 131  In 1926, in an extreme decision recounted above, 132  the Supreme Court 
permitted General Electric to use a patent license to impose price limitations on its rival 
(Westinghouse) for the sale of light bulbs making use of its patented technology.133 Some 
                                                 
127 William E. Kovacic, The Future Adaptation of the Per Se Rule of Illegality in U.S. Antitrust Law, 
2021 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) [hereinafter Future Adaptation]. The principal landmark case 
defining this development in the courts is Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. United States, 310 U.S. 150 (1940), 
which held that agreements to set prices were subject to summary condemnation without regard to their actual 
market effects. Id. at 223–24 & n.59. 
128 Future Adaptation, supra note 127. See also N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 
(1958) (“This principle of per se condemnation not only makes the type of restraints which are proscribed by 
the Sherman Act more certain to the benefit of everyone concerned, but it also avoids the necessity for an 
incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation into the entire history of the industry involved, 
as well as related industries, in an effort to determine at large whether a particular restraint has been 
unreasonable—an inquiry so often wholly fruitless when undertaken.”). 
129 Future Adaptation, supra note 127. See also Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 
441 U.S. 1, 19–21 (1979). 
130 Behavior with cognizable, plausible efficiency justifications ordinarily receives a more elaborate 
inquiry, as part of a “quick look” or fuller rule of reason analysis, to test its actual or likely competitive 
effects. Future Adaptation, supra note 127. See also Calif. Dental Assoc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 526 U.S. 
758, 769–71, 779–81 (1999). Despite the complexities of some patent licensing scenarios, the courts have 
indicated that the presence of patent licenses does not preclude per se condemnation for efforts by rivals to 
set prices or output levels, or to allocate sales territories or customers. Ginsburg et al., supra note 93, at 105–
06; DOJ/FTC IP GUIDELINES, supra note 72, at 17. 
131 See supra Section II.A (describing Supreme Court decisions that gave permissive treatment to 
licensing arrangements with arguably horizontal price-fixing effects). 
132 United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926). 
133  Some commentators have concluded that the Court treated GE’s behavior as “essentially 
unilateral.” HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF THE APPLICATION OF 
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 31–39 (3d ed. 2019) [hereinafter IP AND 
ANTITRUST].  




scholars describe the General Electric rule as approaching total immunity from per se 
illegality: “GE does not authorize rule of reason treatment for price-fixing arrangements. 
Rather, it creates what amounts to an immunity for restraints that fall within its domain, 
and generally leaves naked price fixing falling outside that domain to per se 
condemnation.”134   
Over time, the Supreme Court developed a more nuanced approach as it gained more 
experience with questionable patent licenses and apparent price fixing not closely related 
to innovation. Courts have tended to accord fuller rule of reason treatment to restrictions 
imposed by individual licensors upon individual licensees, even though the restrictions set 
the licensee’s prices or output levels, or limit the licensee’s sales territories or customers 
to which it can sell.135 It appears that patent owners have the most leniency to create 
licensing agreements that may restrain competition when they appear to be acting 
individually to advance their own self-interest to recover their investment costs, and not as 
part of a larger plan with multiple rivals to cartelize a sector. Hovenkamp and his colleagues 
observe that, “the courts have generally been tolerant of horizontal output limitations in 
intellectual property licenses, at least when the restriction was imposed by the licensor on 
each licensee individually and there was no proof of an output limitation agreement among 
the licensees themselves.”136 Firms lose the protection of General Electric, and per se 
condemnation is more likely, where multiple rival firms have imposed the licensing 
restriction or participated in pooling arrangements,137 or the patent license is determined to 
be a pretense for collusion—e.g., if the patent covers minor or irrelevant technology, the 
patent is invalid, or there is a cheap and easy substitute technology not covered by the 
patent.138 This imprecise set of rules governing the patent license and antitrust intersection 
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137 In cases such as Hartford Empire, the courts have found output restrictions illegal in the context 
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See Section II.A.  
138 Id. “GE is limited to cases where the patentee licenses [to] a manufacturer to manufacture the 
patented product and the patent covers all or a ‘significant’ proportion of the resulting product.” IP AND 
ANTITRUST, supra note 133, at 31–35. 




creates two major analytical challenges for courts in cartel enforcement cases: (1) when 
should a license be characterized as mainly horizontal, and (2) how does an antitrust court 
know if licensed patents are weak and the license is a pretense?  
A. Priest’s Approach to Evaluating Competitive Effects in Patent Licensing: A 
Patentee / Licensee Rents Analysis 
George Priest’s still-influential commentary on patent licensing, published 40 years 
ago, recounted the intricate pattern of how industries sometimes shift away from healthy 
competition in prices and innovation toward collusion.139 It may be hard to detect this 
transition because patent licenses provide good cover for collusive agreement. Priest 
responded to this challenge by developing a test rooted in economic theory to determine 
whether a patent license is pro or anticompetitive, through analyzing relative rents in patent 
licensing agreements. Priest also criticized some of the alternative tests that had been used 
by courts, which focused on intent information and patent strength. While Priest’s approach 
is attractive for offering a unified treatment of liability and may be useful in the single 
market context, his analysis did not account for the properties of serial collusion. As 
demonstrated below, the approach is unlikely to be useful in the serial collusion context.  
Priest approached the two questions posed above regarding antitrust enforcement in the 
patent license context by focusing on the flow of patent-based rents and designing what we 
call a “rents test.”140 Priest reasoned that if a patent is strong and the patent owner acts in 
his own self-interest, then he likely captures most of the value from his patent licenses. On 
the other hand, if the patent is weak and the patent owner acts in part at the behest of the 
licensees to help them organize a cartel, then the flow of licensing rents to the licensor 
would be relatively modest.141 When subject to antitrust review, Priest argued that the 
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the products, the arrangement should be rendered illegal.” Mukesh Eswaran, Cross-Licensing of Competing 
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Id. 
141 Professors Joseph F. Brodley and Maureen A. O’Rourke offer this interpretation of Priest’s 
approach: 




former type of agreements should be permitted but the latter should be struck down. Priest 
discounted the use of intent information in more traditional analysis undertaken by courts 
for being unreliable, and information about the importance of the patented technology, i.e., 
patent “strength,” as too costly and difficult for courts to evaluate.  
Yet, while Priest’s approach is useful for evaluating collusion in a single market 
context, his proposed framework fails to consider the competitive dynamics and collusive 
schemes of serial colluders. We argue that when the focus shifts to serial collusion, Priest’s 
rents test fails, and other possible frameworks that consider patentee and licensee intent 
and patent strength deserve more consideration. 
We illustrate the general approach suggested by Priest with the following hypothetical. 
Suppose firms A and B compete vigorously in market 1, enjoying equal market share and 
equal efficiency, but neither is reaping any economic profit. Suppose now firm A achieves 
a drastic invention and gets a patent that would allow it to drive firm B out of market 1.142 
Firm A, acting as a monopolist, can sell to half of the original market for a profit of 5 or 
sell to the entire market for a profit of 8.143 Alternatively, firm A could cooperate with firm 
B and boost the total profit to 10.144 Suppose the firms agree to both use the new invention 
and continue selling to their current customers, and firm B agrees to pay a lump sum patent 
royalty of 4 to firm A. Then, firm A gets a profit of 5 from selling to its half of the market 
plus 4 from the royalty, and firm B gets a profit of 5 from selling to its half of the market 
                                                 
Priest would confirm the cartel diagnosis by examining changes in price, output, and 
market share, particularly in response to variations in manufacturing costs. Stability of 
market shares, output, and price tend to indicate a cartel. A cartel manager would try to 
hold prices and market shares stable, and maintain a price umbrella over less efficient firms 
to avoid the disruptions and shocks that can undermine the cartel. On the other hand, a 
patent monopolist will seek to induce competition at the licensee level, which leads to 
changing market shares, fluctuations in price as manufacturing costs increase or decrease, 
and exit of less efficient firms.  
Joseph F. Brodley & Maureen A. O’Rourke, Patent Settlement Agreements, 16 ANTITRUST 53, 56 (2002) 
[hereinafter Patent Settlement Agreements]. 
142 Economists use the term “drastic” for process innovations that reduce marginal cost so much that 
a firm using a drastic innovation can cut its price low enough to drive out competitors, and in some cases still 
enjoy the benefits of a monopoly price. See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 390–
92 (1988). 
143 Here, we are assuming that firm A’s cost of production jumps up if its output rises above 5. 
144 We assume total cost is lower and profit is greater if A and B share production and A’s facilities 
are not strained by an increase in output above 5. 




minus 4 from the royalty. The relatively large royalty payment from B to A reflects the 
market power created by A’s patent. 
Now consider a similar hypothetical in which firm A’s invention is trivial and the patent 
license is simply a tool to divide the market. By assumption, firm A derives no market 
power from the patent because it has no ability to exclude firm B. That said, through use 
of a patent licensing agreement, the firms could divide the market with each firm limiting 
their sales to their current customers. Let’s assume the total monopoly profit with the old 
technology is 6 and thus each firm gets a profit of 3 from the collusive agreement.145 Now, 
however, the license payment would be trivial, and each firm would earn half of the 
monopoly profit in market 1. 
Comparing the two hypotheticals, Priest would note that a license associated with a 
legitimate patent leads to a significantly higher royalty payment of 4, and dissimilar profits 
of 9 and 1 for firms A and B, respectively. By contrast, when the license is used purely for 
collusion, the royalty payment from B to A is trivial, and the profits of the two firms are 
the same at 3. Priest describes this sort of investigation into the rent split across patent 
licensing participants as a valuable test for distinguishing “good” from “bad” patent 
licenses in terms of their likely competitive effects and social utility. 
While Priest’s approach makes sense if we consider one market in isolation, it fails 
when firms compete in more than one market and use patent licenses to control both 
markets. We start with a hypothetical similar to our first, in which firm A achieves a drastic 
invention in market 1, but now firm B also achieves a drastic invention in market 2. Firm 
A and firm B compete in both markets. Once again, we assume that the inventors can use 
their patents to achieve a monopoly in their respective markets, but in the multi-market 
context, it would be more efficient for the two firms to license to their competitor and share 
the markets equally.146 As before, firm B could make a license payment of 4 to firm A for 
the invention it needs in market 1. Similarly, firm A could make a license payment of 4 to 
firm B to use the invention it needs to compete in market 2. Of course, since the two license 
                                                 
145 We assume that the joint monopoly profit of 6 is less than the joint monopoly profit of 10 that 
flowed from the drastic process innovation. 
146 As before, we assume that sharing the market equally leads to more efficient production because 
firms avoid straining their production capacity. 




payments are a wash, the firms could instead simply grant royalty-free cross licenses to 
each other. So, this result already looks quite dissimilar to the single market context, as the 
rent split across patent participants appears de minimis but actually reflects a mutual 
exchange for value. By contrast, if we suppose instead that the two inventions are both 
trivial and the firms are simply using the patents to implement a collusive cross-license, 
they could also set the royalties at zero, divide the markets, and equally share in the 
monopoly profit in markets 1 and 2. This result on the surface looks the same as the mutual 
exchange for value, but the competitive effects and social benefits of the two exchanges 
are starkly different.  
In sum, while Priest’s rents test may be a valuable tool for evaluating patent licensing 
in the single market context, it is less helpful in the serial colluder context. When two 
markets or products are involved, we can no longer look to the amount of patent royalties 
or the resulting profitability of the two firms from a licensing agreement to determine 
whether the license is likely to be procompetitive or collusive. Instead, mutual exchanges 
for value and collusive dealing may look very similar; small exchanges in royalties may 
reflect a mutual exchange or a pretextual, sham deal to divide a market or customers.147 
B. Reevaluating the Traditional Approach to Analyzing Competitive Effects in 
Patent Licensing: An Intent-Based Analysis or Analysis of Patent Strength 
The traditional approach used by courts to rein in the anticompetitive effect of licensing 
deals often relies on evidence of downstream licensees’ intent to control license terms, or 
evidence that the patent covers a minor technology or is likely invalid or uninfringed.148 
Courts may also try to analyze the strength of a patent from objective information about 
                                                 
147  Moreover, the Priest approach may induce enforcement agencies and courts to mistakenly 
characterize a horizontal licensing agreement as vertical. Suppose firm B offers a patent license that facilitates 
collusion in market 1 by firms A and C, while A and B rely on a patent license from C to help them collude 
in market 2, and B and C rely on a patent license from A to help them collude in market 3. When there is a 
risk of serial collusion, it may be dangerous to accept at face value the claim that a patent license is vertical 
just because the licensor does not produce the product made by the licensees. 
148 See IP AND ANTITRUST, supra note 133, at §§ 31.21, 31.26, 33.15, and 33.38; MacGregor v. 
Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. 329 U.S. 402, 407 (1947) (“If it be determined on remand that the patent is 
invalid, there is no question but that, as MacGregor contends, the price-fixing agreement violates the anti-
trust laws.”)  In the patent settlement context, Hovenkamp observes that antitrust courts avoid the difficult 
question of whether a patent is valid and infringed by instead asking whether it is “’obviously’ invalid or 
very weak.” Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rule of Reason and the Scope of the Patent, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
515, 541 (2015).  




the patented technology, such as through testimony from expert witnesses and other 
sources. As previously noted, Priest distrusts intent evidence because he considers it 
unreliable,149 and he disapproves of an inquiry into the merits of a patent in the context of 
an antitrust trial—he argues this inquiry is too difficult. 150 Subsequent commentators, 
especially in the Actavis context, also worry about error costs from undertaking this 
analysis. They fear that aggressive enforcement against cartels implemented via patent 
licenses will chill research and development, and that those costs are greater than the social 
costs of under-deterred collusion.151 
It is certainly true that intent evidence is noisy and that courts and parties will face 
increased costs in terms of time and resources from placing greater reliance on whether 
defendants had knowledge of patent weakness or undertaking an on the merits inquiry into 
the strength of patents. Yet, we perceive that courts and commentators have exaggerated 
the potential harm of chilling research and development from these inquiries and ignored 
their value in identifying price fixing.152 Furthermore, “[c]ourts regularly litigate patent 
issues within antitrust cases that involve allegations of sham litigation or allegations that a 
patent was procured by fraud. Courts also regularly conduct ‘mini-trials’ in legal 
malpractice cases involving patent issues such as when a patent is invalidated due to a 
lawyer's alleged incompetence.” 153  Thus, courts appear to have the institutional 
competence to manage a trial within a trial if need be.  
                                                 
149 Priest, supra note 6, at 312–13. 
150 Id. at 309, 333. 
151 See e.g., Melissa J. Hatch & Robin Sumner, United States: A Turducken Task: How Actavis 
Invites Relitigation of Patent Merits, (Dec. 12, 2013), 
https://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/patent/280776/a-turducken-task-how-actavis-invites-relitigation-of-
patent-merits; Adam Mossoff, et al., How Antitrust Overreach is Threatening Healthcare Innovation, 
FEDERALIST SOCIETY: REGULATORY TRANSPARENCY PROJECT (Jan. 28, 2019), https://regproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/RTP-Intellectual-Property-Working-Group-Paper-Drug-Patents.pdf.  
152 For a discussion of the costs and benefits of analysis of intent in price fixing cases, see Ronald 
A. Cass & Keith N. Hylton, Antitrust Intent, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 657, 666–70 (2001). Michael Carrier 
acknowledges that intent inquiries create both false positives and false negatives but is critical of “blind 
deference to the patent system.” Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. PA. L. 
REV. 761, 764 (2002). 
153 Joshua B. Fischman, The Circular Logic of Actavis, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 9, 140–41 (2016). For 
non-patent trials addressing patent strength, see, for example, Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1065 (2013) 
(legal malpractice); Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172 
(1965) (Section 2 claims involving fraud in procuring a patent); and Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. 
v. Columbia Pictures, Inc., 508 U.S. 49 (1993) (sham copyright suit and Sherman Act Sections 1 and 2 
claims). 




C. Charting a Way Forward to Evaluating Patents in Antitrust Suits: Rigorous 
Analysis in the Serial Collusion Context 
We admire the elegance of the Priest test in the context of isolated cartels, but we also 
believe that Priest overstates the costs of asking antitrust courts to probe the quality of 
patents, patent licenses, and patent assertions that might be used to foster collusion. Such 
inquiries are essential for detection of collusion in settings where serial collusion is possible 
and the Priest test is apt to be ineffective. Moreover, rigorous antitrust review of patents 
does not threaten innovation to the extent that detractors warn.  
Commentators who favor deferential antitrust review of patent licensing often 
exaggerate the importance of patents as a source of innovative incentive,154 and underplay 
patents’ potential for competitive harm. Surveys of most research and development 
managers rate patents as the fourth or fifth most important method of appropriating value 
from inventions, the exception being the pharmaceutical context where patents rank first. 
Further, most patents cover minor and relatively obvious inventions. About 60% of the 
patents granted on chemicals are not renewed to their full term, suggesting the advances 
achieved in these patents may not be significant.155 This is no surprise; many patents are 
obtained for reasons other than blocking imitation, like gaining bargaining power in 
lawsuits, license negotiations, or impressing investors.156 In addition, there are other means 
                                                 
154 Empirical evidence suggests that patent incentives have little impact on innovation with the 
exception of pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, medical instruments, “and possibly specialty chemicals.” 
Bronwyn H. Hall & Dietmar Harhoff, Recent Research on the Economics of Patents, 4 ANN. REV. ECON. 
541, 548 (2012). See also Michael A. Klein, Secrecy, The Patent Puzzle and Endogenous Growth, 126 
EUROPEAN ECON. REV. 1, 1 (2020) [hereinafter Patent Puzzle]. Klein summarizes findings of various 
empirical studies that find weak or no connection between the strengthening of patent regimes and increases 
in innovation, noting that empirical studies “find strong evidence that strengthening the patent regime 
increases . . .  patenting!” Id. Klein adds: “First, firms routinely decide not to patent their innovations. Surveys 
of European and U.S. firms find that the average propensity to patent is between 30–55%. Second, firms 
widely consider secrecy to be a more effective appropriation mechanism than patents.” Id. at 2. 
155 Carlos J. Serrano, The Dynamics of the Transfer and Renewal of Patents, 41 RAND J. ECON. 
686, 693 (2010). 
156 Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and 
Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) 25 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 7552, 
2000) [hereinafter Intellectual Assets] (“One broader use of patents observed particularly in chemical (apart 
from drugs) and other discrete product industries is their combination to build patent fences around some 
patented core invention. Such fence building involves the patenting, though not licensing (nor necessarily 
even commercializing), of variants and other inventions that might substitute for the core innovation in order 
to preempt rivals from introducing competing innovations.”). See also Patent Puzzle, supra note 154, at 2 
(“When firms do patent, it is often for reasons other than protecting their innovation from imitation as 




to protect intellectual property outside the patent system. Trade secrecy is the favored 
method of obtaining value from process inventions in the chemical industry and other 
sectors.157 And of course, the risks to innovative incentives must be balanced against the 
social costs of serial collusion, which has not been adequately deterred thus far.  
Further, a more rigorous evaluation is especially important in the serial collusion 
context. There is good reason to believe that the patent portfolios built by serial colluders 
like those in the chemical industry contain many weak patents, patents that are likely 
invalid, and/or patents covering technology that is unlikely to be commercialized. 
Presumably, when firms compete in industries like the chemical industry, they have an 
incentive to challenge weak patents for invalidity in opposition proceedings in Europe and 
Japan, inter partes review at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), and 
declaratory judgment proceedings in U.S. federal courts. Yet, these kinds of challenges 
tend to disappear when competitors cooperate in serial cartels.158 The colluding firms are 
likely to move in the opposite direction by settling patent litigation or validity 
challenges.159 These agreements may then include no-challenge clauses in patent licenses 
that discourage parties from monitoring patent quality and challenging weak patents.160 As 
                                                 
typically assumed. . . . In particular, patents are increasingly used strategically for their ‘blocking’ effect on 
rival innovations.”). 
157 Cohen and co-authors observe: “With regard to the protection of new processes, … [s]ecrecy is 
commonly the dominant mechanism, as in the chemicals industries, semiconductors and others.” Intellectual 
Assets, supra note 156, at 6. They summarize research describing “how chemical firms will sometimes 
protect an innovation by applying for one or more patents on different elements of an innovation, while 
keeping other elements secret.” Id. at 7. They find “for product innovations, several industries apply for 
patents for more than two-thirds of their innovations, including chemicals (nec), drugs, mineral products, and 
medical equipment. In contrast, there are also many industries that applied for patents on fewer than 15% of 
their product innovations, including food, textiles, glass, steel and other metals.” Id. at 16 n.36. 
158 Jay Pil Choi, Patent Pools and Cross-Licensing in the Shadow of Patent Litigation, 51 INT’L 
ECON. REV. 441, 458–59 (2010) (“[patent pools] can have the effect of sheltering invalid patents from 
challenges” and contribute to an environment in which there is a “serious lack of private incentives to weed 
out patents of suspect value through litigation.”). 
159 The existence of a cartel that is made possible (or facilitated) by a patent license discourages 
licensees from inventing around or challenging the patent. See United States v. Masonite, 316 U.S. 265, 281 
(1942). As noted above, many patent-licensing/price fixing cases in the first half of the twentieth century 
involved settlement of patent litigation. Supra section I.A.  
160 Licensing of IP Rights, supra note 96, at 23 (“A no-challenge clause imposes direct or indirect 
obligations not to challenge the validity of the licensor’s intellectual property right. Such clauses may conflict 
with the overriding interest of ensuring that IP rights are lawful. Invalid intellectual property rights should 
be eliminated because [they] stifle[] innovation rather than promoting it. Since licensees are often the parties 
with the greatest technical ability and economic incentive to challenge improperly granted IP rights, it is 
appropriate to impose limitations on no-challenge clauses.”). 




a result, weak patents and collusive schemes proliferate, blocking entry for new 
competitors and expansion by existing rivals.  
V. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
There is strong deference in the law to the protection of intellectual property and 
monopoly rents associated with innovation. Sophisticated cartels can capitalize on this 
deference. Our finding that patents increased from the pre-plea to the plea period and then 
again from the plea to the post-plea period for chemical firms that have been found to have 
regularly participated in cartels implies that firms are using patents to enhance the profits 
of their conspiracies. These patent surges may be facilitating cartel structures or may be 
harming both non-cartel firms and potential entrants. The surge in patents from the pre-
plea to the plea period by non-producers that are among the most active cartel firms also 
suggests a sophisticated use of patents to enhance the portfolio of cartels that these firms 
may be running. 
In an earlier article, we presented four principal policy recommendations to address the 
phenomenon of serial collusion.161 First, antitrust enforcement agencies should work with 
cartel participants to carry out cartel reconstructions to help enforcement agencies learn 
how each cartel worked, who was responsible, and what other markets might be affected. 
Second, antitrust agencies should engage in more extensive monitoring of serial cartel 
offenders, with the monitoring obligation imposed in sentencing, settlement, or plea 
agreements. Third, existing leniency programs should be supplemented with bounty 
programs that give company insiders monetary rewards for informing on cartels. One 
major aim of such rewards would be to peel small firms away from cartels. Fourth, we 
would mandate adjustments in merger review for transactions involving a serial colluder. 
The revised merger control regime would mandate review of mergers from a coordinated 
effects perspective whenever a serial colluder notifies an enforcement agency regarding a 
merger for review. 
In the balance of this paper, we supplement our previous recommendations with 
proposals that emerge from our study of patent practices and serial collusion. Presented 
below are a number of policy recommendations that, if implemented, would improve the 
                                                 
161 Serial Collusion, supra note 14.  




ability of the competition policy system to detect and deter harmful collusive schemes that 
draw upon patent practices for their effectiveness. 
 
Expanding Registration and Notification Obligations  
 
Actavis and other pay-for-delay cases have renewed our awareness of how patent 
settlements can serve anticompetitive ends. In July 2002, the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) issued a study that documented branded drug producers’ use of patent infringement 
settlements to delay market entry by producers of generic equivalents.162 The following 
year, Congress passed the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization 
Act, which included a requirement that the parties to such settlements provide the FTC 
with a copy of their agreement. 163  Implementation of this provision has enabled the 
Commission to monitor and study pay-for-delay agreements. The notification mechanism 
has enhanced the FTC’s ability to track industry trends and to identify possible targets for 
law enforcement intervention.164  
For patent settlements, the pay-for-delay notification obligation is the exception, not 
the norm. As Joseph Brodley and Maureen O’Rourke explain, antitrust agencies do not 
enjoy ready access to most patent settlement agreements:  
Antitrust scrutiny of patent settlements is further constrained because patent 
settlements are not disclosed to enforcement agencies. To be sure, the Patent 
Act requires filing of interference settlements and collateral agreements 
with the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). But it appears doubtful that 
the PTO can police disclosure of collateral agreements and, under the Third 
Circuit’s decision in United States v. FMC Corp., the Department of Justice 
lacks standing to enforce compliance. . . . [D]efendants in settlement cases 
benefit from two legal presumptions that, while legitimate in themselves, 
impede antitrust challenge: a patent is presumed valid, and courts have 
frequently declared that patent settlements are to be encouraged.165 
                                                 
162 FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY 
(2002), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/generic-drug-entry-prior-patent-
expiration-ftc-study/genericdrugstudy_0.pdf.  
163 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-
173, §§ 1111-1118, 117 Stat. 2066 (Dec. 8, 2003) (creating patent settlement notification mechanism). 
164 Press Release, FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC Staff Issues FY 2017 Report on Branded Drug 
Firms’ Patent Settlements with Generic Competitors (Dec. 3, 2020), https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/press-releases/2020/12/ftc-staff-issues-fy-2017-report-branded-drug-firms-patent 
165 Patent Settlement Agreements, supra note 141, at 53. 





To close this gap, we would envision as an initial step that Congress would enact 
legislation that gives the FTC authority to establish a reporting system that mandates the 
disclosure to the FTC of patent settlements in infringement cases. The reporting mechanism 
could be modeled upon the system, described immediately above, for reverse payment 
settlements in the pharmaceutical sector. The legislation would give the FTC authority to 
define categories of transactions subject to the reporting requirement. Relevant criteria for 
establishing the reporting obligation might include the size of parties to the licensing 
arrangement, whether licensing practices in a sector had previously been the subject of 
antitrust proceedings, and other factors deemed relevant based on the experience of 
antitrust agencies examining the patent system and commercial licensing practices.166   
A more ambitious program of disclosure would require the notification to the federal 
antitrust agencies of a larger body of patent licensing agreements. We would support the 
adoption of a new statute that delegated to the FTC the authority to promulgate rules that 
define the reporting obligation.167 A model for this process would be the machinery used 
to delimit the merger reporting obligation imposed by the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust 
Improvements Act of 1976.168 Under this statute, Congress established a mandatory pre-
merger reporting program and delegated its implementation through rulemaking and other 
administrative actions to the FTC. By this mechanism, we envision the creation of a dataset 
that enables the federal antitrust agencies to observe larger patterns of patenting activity. 
This data would also expand agency knowledge of patent licensing behavior to inform the 
                                                 
166 As suggested in this paper, federal antitrust agencies have accumulated considerable knowledge 
about patent-antitrust issues in the course of conducting investigations, prosecuting cases, and performing 
studies. Many of these activities are described in William E. Kovacic, Intellectual Property Policy and 
Competition Policy, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 421 (2011); William E. Kovacic, The Importance of 
History in the Design of Competition Policy Strategy: The Federal Trade Commission and Intellectual 
Property, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 319 (2007); and William E. Kovacic & Andreas P. Reindl, An 
Interdisciplinary Approach to Improving Competition Policy and Intellectual Property Policy, 28 FORDHAM 
INT’L L.J. 1002 (2004). 
167 Among other tasks, the rulemaking deliberations would identify the scope of information that 
various reporting thresholds might elicit and the burden associated with compliance. 
168 Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, Sec. 201, §7A, 90 
Stat. 1383, 1390-91 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §18a (2012)). 




development of cartel cases, as well as guide the investigation of mergers and single-firm 
conduct.169 
 
Expanding “Super Plus Factors” to Cover Strategic Patent Surging 
 
In earlier work, we introduced the concept of a “super plus factor.”170 Plus factors are 
economic actions and outcomes, above and beyond parallel conduct by oligopolistic firms, 
that are largely inconsistent with unilateral conduct but largely consistent with explicitly 
coordinated action. 171  When the conduct or outcome leads to the strong inference of 
explicit collusion, then the plus factor is referred to as a super plus factor.172 We suggest 
that if there is a surge of patents by firms in an industry that have a history of colluding 
with one another, and there is no such surge by firms in the industry that have no history 
of explicit collusion, and each serial colluding firm is effectively refusing to license any 
producer outside of the group of historical cartel participants, then this conduct should be 
treated as a super plus factor. In addition, if a serial colluder that is a non-producer has a 
concurrent surge in patent activity and licenses only to other serial colluders, then this 
activity should be treated as a super plus factor pertaining to the involvement of the non-
producer in the cartel. 
This application of super plus factors to the serial collusion context can be expanded to 
further conduct as well. Suppose firm B and C operate a series of cartels together and B 
has unintentionally sold beyond its agreed upon market share for product 3, while C has 
undersold.  A transfer needs to occur from B to C to correct the imbalance in sales for 
product 3. This re-balancing can be directly handled in cash in the license agreement in 
product 2, where B is licensed by C. 173  Looking at cartels in a stovepipe without 
considering the portfolio of cartels run by each firm, this transfer would be completely 
                                                 
169 As with a reporting mechanism for the settlement of infringement disputes, the design of the 
reporting system for patent licenses would draw upon the substantial experience of the federal antitrust 
agencies in dealing with patent-antitrust issues. See supra note 160. 
170 William E. Kovacic et al., Plus Factors and Agreement in Antitrust Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 393 
(2012) [hereinafter Super Plus Factors]. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. at 396–97. 
173 C sues for breach of the product 2 license, or threatens to do so, and B settles for the amount 
needed to “true up” the product 3 cartel.  




invisible to enforcement authorities—it is part of a private license agreement and does not 
involve the product in question (product 3). Broadening of the interfirm transfer super plus 
factor we identified previously to multiple products for serial colluders would be useful in 
this scenario as well.174 This is another way in which closer examination of patent licensing 
by serial colluders that interact in multiple product markets can inform the identification 
of conduct that suggests the existence of a collusive agreement. 
 
 
Expanding Patent Misuse to Apply to Related Patents  
 
The patent misuse doctrine states that a patent used to facilitate an antitrust violation 
cannot be enforced.175 The doctrine creates a desirable pathway for new firms to enter 
markets that had been cartelized with threats of patent assertion. Courts should use their 
discretion and recognize that the defense is good even for patents owned by serial colluders 
who did not produce in the market in question so long as other members of the network of 
serial colluders were found liable for collusion in that market.176 This may be significant 
because, as we observed in Section I, non-producers often obtain many patents on products 
in cartelized markets, and they may use those patents in various ways to facilitate collusion. 
Thus, any patent covering the cartel product, or some other product that was used to 
facilitate the collusion, should be subject to a misuse defense by any new entrant or non-
colluding firm that wants to use the “innovation.” Some may argue that this would thwart 
genuine innovation in the product, but we argue that the cartel firms forfeit the monopoly 
protection of patent laws when they use patents to further anticompetitive conduct. 
 
Greater Agency Investigation of the Role of Patents in Serial Cartels. 
 
                                                 
174 Super Plus Factors, supra note 170, at 423 n.117 (“It is a relatively simple matter for firms in an 
oligopoly to engage in contractual relationships with regard to a broad range of activities, many of which are 
completely meaningless from a productivity standpoint, and to use allegations of contract breach, and ensuing 
settlements, to legitimize cartel side payments.”). 
175 This principle is embodied in the existing law of patent misuse.  Revisiting Patent Misuse, supra 
note 25. 
176 Such an approach also would appear to involve the exercise of the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office of its existing power to rescind patents related to a patent for which the patentee made misstatements 
in its application. Id. 




Today, EC decisions rarely mention patents when describing firm conduct at issue in 
prohibition decisions. For the 32 chemical cartels enumerated in Appendix A, patents are 
hardly mentioned in the corresponding EC decisions.177 This is a remarkable omission 
given the historically significant role of patents in price-fixing agreements. Perhaps given 
scarce enforcement resources, the EC chose not to investigate cartel use of patents and 
focused instead on the low-hanging fruit of amnesty applicants’ disclosures about price 
targets and customer and market share agreements. Going forward, European, U.S., and 
other global cartel investigators need to learn whether and what role patents play in 
instances of serial collusion. We note that in recent merger inquiries, the EC’s Directorate 
for Competition has taken a greater interest in patenting and patent portfolios as focal 
points in merger analysis.178 This indicates a greater willingness by enforcement agencies 
to undertake the laborious process of mapping out patent portfolios and, perhaps, licensing 
arrangements, as foundations for building cases beyond challenges to mergers. This is a 
helpful step forward. 
 
Liability for Cartel Facilitators 
A serial colluder that is facilitating collusion in a product that they do not make should 
be found liable in civil and criminal actions for collusion, just like producers.179 In addition, 
they should be subject to civil liability from private litigants in class actions and individual 
suits. Liability and the determination of damages in such cases should be rooted in, at a 
minimum, a but-for theory of harm: but-for the facilitating conduct of the defendant, what 
would the producers have been able to accomplish through their collusion? Thus, the cartel 
facilitators’ marginal harm should be traceable to them in future lawsuits. Cartel 
facilitators, like Fides/AC Treuhand, have already been penalized for participation in 
                                                 
177 Just four of the cases listed in Appendix A—Food Flavor Enhancers, Hydrogren Periodide 
(2006), Organic Peroxide, and Polypropelene—mention patents.  
178 Bayer/Monsanto, Case M.8084, Merger Procedure Regulation 139/2004 (Mar. 21, 2018). 
179 This comports with existing U.S. doctrine which have used a “hub-and-spoke” model to impose 
civil and criminal liability on hold vertically-related firms that facilitate the operation of a price-fixing cartel. 
See supra note 95 (collecting cases). 




European cartels even though Fides/AC Treuhand is not a producer of any chemical 
product.180 
 
Creation of an Anti-Cartel Research Program Focused on Serial Collusion and the Role 
of Patents in Cartel Maintenance 
 
In this Article, we have focused mainly on the use of patents to facilitate serial 
collusion in the chemical industry, but our findings are relevant to the study and  
prosecution of collusion in a number of other important economic sectors. The electronics 
and auto parts industries, for example, have also been racked by serial collusion in recent 
years, and these are both patent-intensive industries.181 Electronics is much like chemicals 
in that the pattern of anticompetitive behavior goes back a century. It would be worthwhile 
to study cartels in these industries and try to identify what role patents played. We would 
also propose using the research and information-gathering authority of the FTC, under 
Section 6(b) of the FTC Act, to study patent licensing. Such a study would seek to test 
some of the conjectures set out in this Article and determine, as noted above, whether a 
mandate that firms register patent licenses with antitrust agencies might be appropriate.182 
    
VI. CONCLUSION 
Over a century ago, federal antitrust enforcement began to give careful attention to the 
possibility that patent licensing practices could enable rival producers to organize and 
                                                 
180 Unobserved Collusion, supra note 14, at 330. See also Heat Stabilisers in Appendix A at 188-
190.  
181  “The German chemical company BASF participated in 21[price-fixing agreements] with 17 of 
those ending in the current millennium. The French cement company Lafarge SA participated in 21 with 16 
of those ending in the current millennium. The German pharmaceutical company Bayer AG participated in 
20 with 5 of those ending in the current millennium. The Japanese conglomerate Hitachi Ltd. participated in 
20 with 18 of those ending in the current millennium.” Serial Collusion, supra note 14, at 22 n.22.  Marvao 
describes the problem of serial collusion “in the manufacture of transport and electrical equipment.” Id.  
182 The Final TNEC Report contained the following recommendation regarding the notification to 
the government of patent licenses: 
Recording of transfers and agreements.–We recommend that any sale, license, 
assignment, or other disposition of any patent be evidenced by an instrument in writing 
and that the same be required of any condition, agreement, or undertaking relating to any 
sale or disposition of any such patent; and that in any such case a copy of such written 
instrument be filed with the Federal Trade Commission within 30 days after execution.  
TNEC FINAL REPORT, supra note 75, at 37.  




manage price-fixing cartels. In modern enforcement practice and scholarly debate about 
antitrust policy, patent licensing practices have received comparatively little attention as 
instruments of cartel management. Compared to other possible focal points for anti-cartel 
enforcement, patent licensing arrangements can create difficult analytical complexities. A 
lesson from the earlier generations of antitrust-patent cases is that the use of patents by 
alleged price-fixers is often abstruse. Enforcers and courts may need to work harder to 
understand the technology, patent practices, and industry context specific to a case.183 As 
it is, enforcement is often a demanding endeavor in terms of resources, time, and expertise 
needed to prosecute a case.184 It is a daunting challenge for an enforcement agency to 
assemble a narrative that gives a court confidence that anticompetitive effects predominate 
in the face of benign or procompetitive effects often associated with patent licenses. In 
short, cases at the intersection of antitrust and patent law can be intimidating, and it takes 
a patient, determined, and properly resourced government prosecutor to execute them 
successfully. 
We believe the gains from focusing greater attention on patent licensing warrant the 
effort to deal with the analytical complexities. Licensing arrangements can provide 
attractive means for serial colluders to cloak illegal collaboration under the guise of 
                                                 
183 Till, supra note 5, at 309–310: 
While patent licensing arrangements are theoretically preferable to pure monopoly 
situations, often these agreements contain provisions designed to restrict competition. 
Increasingly these arrangements have become more sophisticated as the Justice 
Department’s Antitrust Division has sought to confine the exercise of monopoly to the 
patent itself. In this effort, the government has generally secured the support of the courts. 
But the cases instituted by the Department of Justice have involved only a small number 
of industries. It is therefore impossible to say whether, in the many not investigated, blatant 
restrictions are still fully spelled out in licensing arrangements or whether they have simply 
been driven underground. In both cases, a comprehension of the restrictions contained in a 
license agreement requires knowledge, often extensive knowledge, of the operation of the 
industry and its trade practices. 
184 See Priest, supra note 6, at 365: 
The problem of detecting illegitimate arrangements . . . is more difficult than merely 
identifying those particular practices that might be employed by both cartels and patent 
licensors. . . . The most telling example is where a group of firms appoints a licensor and, 
foregoing explicit price, output, or territorial restrictions, authorizes the licensor to charge each 
member firm a royalty with the understanding that at later date the royalties exacted will be 
rebated in full. It would be impossible to detect a cartel agreement of this nature without a 
detailed investigation into the relationships between the licensees and the licensor, because the 
behavior of each licensee will appear irreproachable; each can set price exactly equal to its 
apparent marginal cost which will include the royalty. 




seemingly legitimate activity, in which direct interaction among competing firms might 
seem normal and unremarkable from an antitrust standpoint. As antitrust systems seek to 
deter collusion through more powerful detection mechanisms and stronger sanctions, one 
cannot underestimate the ingenuity and perseverance that producers will deploy to devise 
counter measures and strategies that permit the accomplishment of their collusive 
objectives. Licensing arrangements that are either invisible to external observers or seem 
innocuous at first glance can provide means to this end. 
We also believe the burdens associated with the analysis suggested here may be 
manageable. There are opportunities today for the antitrust enforcement community, 
especially U.S. enforcement agencies, to apply the substantial body of learning that they 
have accumulated regarding the operation of the intellectual property system and the use 
of patents in commerce. Intensified examination of the possibilities for patent licensing to 
facilitate coordination by serial colluders would build upon a significant foundation of 
enforcement experience and research. Such a program would complement other major 
efforts to apply competition policy to high technology sectors and industries that rely 
heavily upon the application of patents and other intellectual property rights.  
For roughly half a century, from the 1920s through the 1970s, U.S. antitrust policy 
adopted a highly skeptical view of many patent licensing practices. This skepticism has 
attenuated over the past forty years, as antitrust enforcement agencies and courts disavowed 
the hostility toward the same doctrines and enforcement policy statements. The rebalancing 
that has taken place ought not to obscure the fact that some of the concerns of the 
enforcement community were not illusory. Our proposals seek to give effect to the sound 
understandings of the earlier era and bring the force of modern learning to bear upon the 






EC Chemical Product Decisions and Cartel Firms  
 




1. Bitumen: Case COMP / 38.456 – Bitumen - NL, September 13, 2006 
a. Shell 
2. Butadiene Rubber: Case COMP/F/38.638 – Butadiene Rubber and Emulsion 
Styrene Butadiene Rubber, November 29, 2006 
a. Bayer, Shell 
3. Calcium Carbide: Case COMP/39.396 – Calcium carbide and magnesium based 
reagents for the steel and gas industries, July 22, 2009 
a. Akzo Nobel, Degussa 
4. Candle Waxes: Case COMP/39181 – Candle Waxes, October 1, 2008 
a. Shell 
5. *Cartonboard: IV/C/33.833 - Cartonboard, July 13, 1994 
a. Fides/AC Treuhand  
6. Chloroprene Rubber: COMP/38629 - Chloroprene Rubber, December 5, 2007 
a. Bayer 
7. Choline Chloride: Case COMP/E-2/37.533 – Choline Chloride, Comm’n 
Decision, December 9, 2004 
a. Akzo Nobel, BASF 
8. Citric Acid: Case COMP/E-1/36.604 – Citric Acid, Comm’n Decision, 2002 
O.J.(L239) 18. December 5, 2001 
a. Bayer 
9. *Fatty Acids: IV/31.128 — Fatty Acids, Comm'n Decision, December 2, 1986 
a. Fides/AC Treuhand 
10. Food Flavor Enhancers: Case COMP/C.37.671 – Flood Flavour Enhancers, 
Comm’n Decision 2004 (L 75) December 17, 2002 
a. <None from those listed in Figure 5> 
11. Heat Stabilizers: COMP/38589 – Heat Stablisers, November 11, 2009 
a. Akzo Nobel, Arkema/ Atofina, Elf Aquitaine, Fides/AC Treuhand 
12. *Hydrogen Peroxide: IV/30.907 — Peroxygen products, November 23, 1984 
a. Atochem, Solvay, Degussa 
13. Hydrogen Peroxide: Case COMP/F/38.620 – Hydrogen Peroxide and Perborate, 
May 3, 2006 
a. Akzo Nobel, Arkema/Atofina, Degussa, Elf Aquitaine, Solvay 
14. Lysine: Case COMP/36.545/F3. Amino Acids, June 7, 2000  
a. <None from those listed in Figure 5> 
15. Methacrylates: Case No COMP/F/38.645 — Methacrylates, May 31, 2006 
a. Arkema/Atofina, Degussa, ICI, Elf Aquitaine 
16. Methionine: Case C.37.519 – Methionine, Comm’n Decision, 2002 (L 255) 1. 
July 2, 2002 
a. Degussa, Rhone Poulenc/Aventis 
17. Methyglucamine: Case COMP/E-2/37.978 – Methylglucamine, Comm’n 
Decision, November 27, 2002 
a. Rhone Poulenc/Aventis 
18. Monochloroacetic Acid: Case COMP/E-1/.37.773– MCAA, Comm’n Decision, 
January 19, 2005 
a. Akzo Nobel, Arkema/Atofina, Elf Aquitaine, Fides/AC Treuhand, Hoechst 




19. Organic Peroxides: Case COMP/E-2/37.857 – Organic Peroxyde, Comm’n 
Decision, December 10, 2003 
a. Akzo Nobel, Arkema/Atofina, Degussa, Fides/AC Treuhand, 
20. *Polyethylene: IV/31.866, LdPE, December 21, 1988 
a. Atochem, BASF, Bayer, Dow, Enichem, Fides/AC Treuhand, Hoechst, 
ICI, Repsol, Shell 
21. *Polypropylene: IV/31.149 – Polypropylene, April 23, 1986 
a. Atochem, BASF, Fides/AC Treuhand, Hoechst, ICI, Rhone 
Poulenc/Aventis, Shell, Solvay 
22. *Potash: IV/795 – Kaliand Salz/Kali Chemie, December 21, 1973 
a. BASF, Solvay 
23. *PVC: IV/31.865, PVC, December 21, 1988 
a. Atochem, BASF, Enichem, Fides/AC Treuhand, Hoechst, ICI, Shell, 
Solvay 
24. Rubber Chemicals: Case COMP/F/38.443 – Rubber Chemicals, Comm’n 
Decision December 21, 2005 (summary at 2006 (L 353) 50) 
a. Akzo Nobel (through Flexsys)185, Bayer 
25. *Soda Ash: Case COMP/33.133-B: Soda-ash, December 19, 1990 
a. BASF, Solvay 
26. Sodium Chlorate: Case COMP/38.695 – Sodium Chlorate, June 11, 2008 
a. Akzo Nobel, Arkema/Atofina, Elf Aquitaine 
27. Sodium Gluconate: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-01-
1355_en.htm?locale=en#file.tmp_Foot_1, March 19, 2002 
a. Akzo Nobel 
28. Sorbates: Case COMP/E-1/37.370 – Sorbates, Comm’n Decision October 1, 2003 
a. Hoechst 
29. *Synthetic Fibers: IV/30.810 - Synthetic fibres, July 4, 1984 
a. Bayer, Hoechst, ICI, Rhone Poulenc/Aventis 
30. Vitamins: Case COMP/E-1/37.512– Vitamins, Comm’n Decision, 2001 O.J. (L6) 
November 21, 2001 
a. BASF, Rhone Poulenc/Aventis, Solvay  
31. *Woodpulp: IV/29.725 - Wood pulp, December 19, 1984 
a. Fides/AC Treuhand 
32. Nitrile Butadiene Rubber: COMP/38.628 - Nitrile Butadiene Rubber, January 23, 
2008 
a. Bayer  
 
  
                                                 
185 See the cited EC decision at para 13, “The holding company for Flexsys is Flexsys Holding B.V. of which 
Akzo Nobel Chemicals International B.V. holds 50%, the remaining 50% being held by Solutia Inc and 
Solutia Europe N.V. together.” 






I. GOOGLE PATENTS ADVANCED SEARCH INSTRUCTIONS 
FIELD INPUT 
Synonym CL=“[product keyword]” 
Product keywords are listed below (see “Product Keywords” section) 
Claims search (CL=): 
▪ Restricts search to claims of patents 
▪ Increases relevance of resulting patents by limiting results to patents in 
which the product is a notable input or process patents for the product 
Note: 
▪ To search the union of multiple search terms, separate each “synonym” 
with OR 
▪ To search the intersection of multiple search terms, separate each 
“synonym” with AND 
Date Choose “filing” from the dropdown list 
Enter years from January 1 to January 1 of the next year (i.e. 1984-01-01 – 1985-01-
01) 
Note: 
▪ Pre-plea years: 10 years prior to the start of the earliest starting year of 
a firm’s plea period in the corresponding EC decision 
▪ Plea years: the earliest starting year of a firm’s plea period in the 
corresponding EC decision to the latest ending year of a firm’s plea 
period in the corresponding EC decision 
▪ Post-plea years: 10 years after the latest ending year of a firm’s plea 
period in the corresponding EC decision 
Inventor Leave blank 
Assignee Firm search terms, university search terms (see “Assignee Search Terms” below) 
Note: 
▪ To search the union of multiple search terms, separate each “synonym” 
with OR 
▪ To search the intersection of multiple search terms, separate each 
“synonym” with AND 
Patent Office Do not change (this generates a global search) 
Language Do not change 
Status Choose “grant” from the dropdown list 
Type Choose “patent” from the dropdown list 
Sort by Relevance 
Note: This option can be changed only after the search results are displayed. 
                                                 
186 This Appendix was prepared by our three research assistants: Katherine Bartuska, Naira Batoyan, and 
Hope Bodenschatz, at the direction of the authors of the paper. Any errors are the responsibility of the 
authors of the paper. 





II. PRODUCT SELECTION  
 
Focusing on the firms of Akzo, BASF, Bayer, Solvay, and Degussa as producers and 
non-producers, if the pre-plea or the plea period has more than an average of two patents 
per year than chemical product was included. Otherwise, the product was excluded. 
 
III. PRODUCT KEYWORDS 
PRODUCT SEARCH TERM(S) 
1. Bitumen “bitumen” 
2. Butadiene Rubber “butadiene rubber” OR “polybutadiene” 
4. Candle Wax “candle waxes” OR “paraffin waxes” OR “slack waxes” OR 
“candle wax” OR “paraffin wax” OR “slack wax” 
6. Chloroprene Rubber “chloroprene rubber” OR “chlorobutadiene rubber” OR 
“polychloroprene” OR “neoprene” 
8. Citric Acid “citric acid” 
11. Heat Stabilizers “heat stabilizers” OR “heat stabilizer” OR “heat stabilisers” OR 
“heat stabiliser” OR “thermal stabilizers” OR “thermal stabilizer” 
OR “thermal stabilisers” OR “thermal stabiliser” OR “tin 
stabilizers” OR “tin stabilizer” OR “tin stabilisers” OR “tin 
stabiliser” OR “epoxidised soybean oil” OR “epoxidized soybean 
oil” OR “ESBO” 
12. Hydrogen Peroxide 1984 “hydrogen peroxide” OR “hydrogen peroxides” OR “sodium 
perborate” 
13. Hydrogen Peroxide 2006 “hydrogen peroxide” OR “hydrogen peroxides” OR “sodium 
perborate” 
15. Methacrylates “methacrylates” OR “methacrylate” 
16. Methionine “methionine” 
17. Methylglucamine “methylglucamine” OR “meglumine” 
18. Monochloroacetic Acid 
(MCAA) 
“monochloroacetic acid” OR “MCAA” OR “sodium 
monochloroacetate” OR “SMCA” 
19. Organic Peroxides “peroxides” OR “peroxide” OR “peroxy” AND –hydrogen 
Note: when performing a claims search, do not use CL= before  
-hydrogen 
20. Polyethylene “polyethylene” OR “LdPE” 
21. Polypropylene “polypropylene” OR “polypropene” 
23. PVC “PVC” OR “polyvinyl chloride” 
24. Rubber Chemicals “anti-degradants” OR “anti-degradant” OR “antidegradants” OR 
“antidegradant” OR “accelerators” OR “accelerator” OR “rubber 
chemicals” OR “rubber chemical” OR “antioxidants” OR 
“antioxidant” OR “antiozonants” OR “antiozonant” OR “retarder” 
OR “retarders” OR “peptizer” OR “peptizers” 
25. Soda Ash “sodium carbonate” OR “soda ash” 




29. Synthetic Fibers “polyamide textile yarn” OR “polyamide carpet yarn” OR 
“polyester textile yarn” OR “polyamide staple” OR “polyester 
staple” OR “acrylic staple” OR “synthetic fibers” OR “synthetic 
fibres” OR “synthetic fiber” OR “synthetic fibre” 
30. Vitamins “vitamin A” OR “vitamin C” OR “ascorbic acid” OR “vitamin E” 
OR “vitamin B” OR “thiamine” OR “riboflavin” OR “calpan” 
32. Nitrile Butadiene Rubber  “nitrile butadiene rubber” OR “nitrile rubber” OR “acrylonitrile 
butadiene rubber” 
 
IV. ASSIGNEE SEARCH TERMS 
 
Assignee names to be used in all cases, with the exception of the outstanding mergers, 
acquisitions, and name changes listed below.  
Akzo Nobel Atochem / Atofina / 
Arkema* 
Aventis  BASF  
Bayer Degussa Hoechst ICI 
Rhone Poulenc Shell Solvay  
*see Mergers, Acquisitions, and Name Changes below 
 
V. MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND NAME CHANGES – ALL SEARCHES 
 
These cases are relevant in all instances, even when the firms are not in the cartel.  
FIRM SEARCH 
Akzo Nobel Start year – 1993  Akzo OR Nobel 1994 – end year  Akzo Nobel 
Atochem / Atofina / 
Arkema  
Start year – 1999 Atochem 
2000 – 2003 Atochem OR Atofina 
2004 – end year  Atochem OR Atofina OR Arkema 
Bayer  
Start year – 2003  Bayer 
2004 Bayer OR Lanxess 
2005 Bayer 
Hoechst / Rhone 
Poulenc / Aventis 
Search the relevant firms in separate columns for entire time period 
 
VI. MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND NAME CHANGES – CASE SPECIFIC 
FOR CARTEL MEMBERS 
 
CARTEL FIRM SEARCH 
3. Calcium Carbide Degussa 1994 – 2003 Degussa OR SKW 2004 – 2006  Degussa OR SKW OR Alzchem Hart  
8. Citric Acid Bayer 
1981 – 2003 Bayer OR Haarman & Reimer 
2004 Bayer OR Haarman & Reimer OR Lanxess 
2005 Bayer OR Haarman & Reimer 





1948 – 1982  Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann 
1983 – 1990  Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann OR Atochem 








1948 – 1985  Akzo OR Nobel 
1986 – 1993  Akzo OR Nobel OR Eka 
1994 – 2010  Akzo Nobel OR Eka 
Solvay 1984 – 2001  Solvay 2002 – 2010 Solvay OR Ausimont  




1961 – 1982 Pennwalt OR Luperox 
1983 – 1999 Pennwalt OR Luperox OR Atochem 
2000 – 2003 Pennwalt OR Luperox OR Atochem OR 
Atofina 
2004 – 2009 Pennwalt OR Luperox OR Atochem OR 
Atofina OR Arkema 




1966 – 1982 Aquitaine Total Organico  
1983 Aquitaine Total Organico OR Atochem 





1966 – 1982 Aquitaine Total Organico 
 
1983 Aquitaine Total Organico OR Atochem 
1984 – 1993 Atochem 




1986 – 2011  Akzo Nobel and Flexsys are searched 
separately and placed in separate columns 
25. Soda Ash Solvay 1977 – 1985  Kali Chemie OR Solvay 1986 – 2000  Solvay 
26. Sodium Chlorate  Akzo Nobel 
1984 – 1985  Elektrokemiska Aktiebolaget OR Akzo OR 
Nobel 
1986 Elektrokemiska Aktiebolaget OR Eka OR 
Akzo OR Nobel 
1987 – 1993 Eka OR Akzo OR Nobel 
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